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FROM PRIVATE PREJUDICE TO PUBLIC POLICY: HOW
RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVES USE LIBERALISM TO
CONTROL WOMEN’S BODIES—THE UNITED STATES AND
ISRAEL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Gila Stopler*

The Article uses the feminist critique of the patriarchal nature of religion and
liberalism, the feminist critique of flaws in political liberalism, and a socio-political
analysis of the power of religious conservative groups in the United States and Israel
to claim that religious conservatives use the patriarchal nature of liberalism, its
inherent flaws, and conservative political power to turn private religious prejudice
into public policy. Analyzing the constitutional and legal status of religion in the
United States and the recent dramatic changes it has undergone, the Article shows
that contrary to popular belief, and due to the aforementioned factors, the American
model of separation between religion and the state cannot protect women’s rights
against the religious conservative attack. The Article uses a comparative analysis of
the religious conservative attack on women’s rights in Israel to show that despite the
very different religion-state relations, the religious conservative attack in the two
countries is similar in both method and success.
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INTRODUCTION
Control over women’s bodies and sexuality has always been central to human
society, culture, and politics.1 However, in recent years, the clash between religious
patriarchy and a woman’s right to equality, and the corresponding struggle over who
controls women’s bodies, seems to have reached new heights.2 Important reasons for
this escalation have been the pervasive repoliticization of religion and the rise of religious populism, which has united nationalist and religious groups around the desire
to return to traditional gender ideology as part of the struggle against progressive
liberal elites.3 The most common sites of struggle in the United States and Europe
1

SANDRA LEE BARTKY, FEMININITY AND DOMINATION: STUDIES IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY
95–109 (1990).
2
Ruth Rubio-Marín, Gendered Nationalism and Constitutionalism, 18 ICON 441,
444–45 (2020).
3
Michel Rosenfeld, The Conscience Wars in Historical and Philosophical Perspective:
The Clash between Religious Absolutes and Democratic Pluralism, in THE CONSCIENCE WARS:
RETHINKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND EQUALITY 58, 76 (Susanna
Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2018) [hereinafter THE CONSCIENCE
WARS] (discussing the repoliticization of religion and the flourishing of religious consciencebased claims); Susanna Mancini, Introduction: Constitutionalism and Religion in an Age of
Consolidation and Turmoil, in CONSTITUTIONS AND RELIGION 1, 9–12 (Susanna Mancini ed.
2020) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS AND RELIGION] (discussing religious populism). One example from the United States is the Teavangelicals. See Jose Pedro Zuquete, Populism and
Religion, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POPULISM 445, 448 (2017). On populism and its
attack on women’s rights in various European countries, see, e.g., Ruth Rubio-Marín, supra
OF OPPRESSION
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have been women’s reproductive rights and the recognition of same sex marriages,
which are both central to the patriarchal sexual order and its inseparable linking of sex
and marriage.4 At the same time, in Israel, the war over women’s bodies is centered
on the even more fundamental right of women to participate fully and freely in the
public sphere without segregation and exclusion.5 The exclusion and segregation of
women is achieved through rules and practices that “constrain women’s actions,
movement, voice, or appearance” in the public sphere due to their sex.6 The official
motivation for the exclusion and segregation of women in the public sphere in Israel
is to enable ultra-orthodox Jews, and increasingly, other religiously conservative Jews,
who abide by strict modesty rules in their private and communal life, to participate
in the public sphere under conditions that suit their religious beliefs and cultural
practices.7 Thus, just like in the United States, the price of religious conservatives’
religious beliefs is paid by women.
An important common denominator between the recent struggles over sexuality
and women’s bodies is that in these struggles, religious conservatives are successfully turning their private prejudices into public policy.8 By allegedly demanding the
protection of their own rights to religious liberty, conscientious objection, equality,
and, where applicable, multicultural accommodations, religious conservatives are
preventing, and even reversing, progress in women’s rights, and working to create
note 2; Agnieszka BieĔ-Kacaáa, Using Shifting Narratives to Undermine Gender Equality:
Comparative Insights from Hungary, Poland and Turkey, IACL-AIDC BLOG (Feb. 4 2021),
https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/gender/2021/2/4/using-shifting-narratives-to-undermine-gender-equal
ity-comparative-insights-from-hungary-poland-and-turkey [https://perma.cc/79GM-99P3].
4
Some of the Supreme Court cases in these two areas include: Little Sisters of the Poor
Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’r, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018); NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
On the central role of homosexuality in undermining the patriarchal sexual order, see Sylvia A.
Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187, 187–88 (1988).
On reproductive rights and same sex marriage as threatening the link between sexuality and
marriage, see Robert Post, The Politics of Religion: Democracy and The Conscience Wars,
in THE CONSCIENCE WARS, supra note 3, at 473, 474. For a comparison between the United
States and Europe, see Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Conscience Wars in Transnational
Perspective: Religious Liberty, Third-Party Harm, and Pluralism, in THE CONSCIENCE WARS,
supra note 3, at 187, 188–90; Susanna Mancini & Kristina Stoeckl, Transatlantic Conversations: The Emergence of Society-Protective Antiabortion Arguments in the United States,
Europe, and Russia, in THE CONSCIENCE WARS, supra note 3, at 220, 220–21.
5
Gila Stopler, Constitutionalism and Religion in a Jewish and Democratic State, in
CONSTITUTIONS AND RELIGION, supra note 3, at 208, 219–20 [hereinafter Constitutionalism
and Religion]. See generally Yofi Tirosh, Diminishing Constitutional Law: The First Three
Decades of Women’s Exclusion Adjudication in Israel, 18 (3) ICON 821 (2020).
6
See Tirosh, supra note 5, at 824.
7
See Stopler, Constitutionalism and Religion, supra note 5, at 219–20; Tirosh, supra
note 5, at 824.
8
See Stopler, Constitutionalism and Religion, supra note 5, at 219–20.
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wholesale societal change.9 In all of these cases, religious conservatives are using
liberal rights and concepts as a weapon against women.10 One example of the
weaponization of liberal rights in the United States is the use of the First Amendment.11 In National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra (hereinafter
NIFLA), the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court held that California’s FACT Act,
which required crisis pregnancy centers to post notices that other options for pregnancy, including abortion, are available from state-sponsored clinics, violated petitioner’s First Amendment rights.12 Using the weapon metaphor, the four dissenting
Justices objected to the decision, stating that “[m]edical professionals do not, generally
speaking, have a right to use the Constitution as a weapon allowing them rigorously
to control the content of those reasonable conditions.”13 As Catharine MacKinnon
argued, the First Amendment has morphed from a shield for the disempowered
“[in]to a claim by dominant groups to impose and exploit their hegemony”.14 Erwin
Chemerinsky and Michele Goodwin argue that the only way to understand the
Court’s decision in NIFLA “is that it reflects the hostility of the Court’s majority to
reproductive rights and its indifference towards the rights and interests of women.”15
Consequently, it “reflects a dangerous turn in the Court for which we should all be
concerned.”16 While in NIFLA religious conservatives weaponized the free speech
component of the First Amendment, the free exercise of religion has undergone a
similar weaponization process in recent years, both as a constitutional right and as a
statutory right under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act.17 Starting with
the Hobby Lobby case, and through a series of cases on women employees’ right to
9

On this phenomenon in the United States and Europe, see NeJaime & Siegel, supra note
4, at 188–90; Mancini & Stoeckl, supra note 4, at 221–22. On Israel, see Stopler, Constitutionalism and Religion, supra note 5, at 219–20. See generally Tirosh, supra note 5.
10
On a similar tactic of using culture and religion as a sword rather than as shield in civil
adversarial disputes between private parties in family matters, see Ayelet Shachar, Demystifying
Culture, 10 (2) ICON 429, 431 (2012).
11
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Weaponizing the First Amendment: An Equality Reading,
106 VA. L. REV. 1223, 1224 (2020).
12
NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2361 (2018).
13
Id. at 2382. Notably, in this case, the weaponized right used is freedom of speech, but the
method of use and the purpose for using it is to restrict women’s rights. Similarly, though in
a different context, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan labeled this use of the First Amendment as “weaponizing the First Amendment” in the Janus case. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State,
Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting). In
this case the majority accepted the petitioner’s claim that the First Amendment prevents states
and public-sector unions from extracting agency fees from nonconsenting employees whom
they represent.
14
MacKinnon, supra note 11, at 1224.
15
Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Constitutional Gerrymandering against
Abortion Rights: NIFLA v. Becerra, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 61, 118 (2019).
16
Id.
17
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012).
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have contraceptive coverage as part of their workplace health insurance under the
Affordable Care Act (ACA), religious conservative employers, with the help of the
Court and the Trump administration, conjured up a new right to religious liberty of
for-profit corporations and successfully weaponized it against women employees’
basic right to control their own bodies.18
In Israel, religious conservatives use similar tactics, weaponizing liberal rights
protections to roll back hard-won achievements in women’s rights that, until recently,
seemed to be unassailable and indisputable.19 Consequently, even the right of women
to be freely present in the public sphere, to freely use public buses, or to get equal
access to public services, has been put into question and even denied.20
In this Article, I will analyze the tactics of religious conservatives in the United
States and Israel to argue that the success of the weaponization of liberal concepts
against women’s right to control their bodies stems from the patriarchal nature of
liberalism and from flaws within liberal theory and practice. These flaws legitimate
religious bigotry, especially bigotry in matters involving gender and sexuality, and
enable religious conservatives to undermine liberal rights protections regardless of
the formal relationship between religion and the state, even where religion is
constitutionally separated from the state as it is in the United States of America.
The choice to compare the United States and Israel needs some explanation.
Allegedly, the relationship between religion and the state in the United States and
in Israel could not be more different. The United States has, at least until recently,
been considered a bastion of the secular state, while Israel, from its inception,
integrated religion into law and politics.21 While the ties between religion and the
state in Israel clearly violate women’s right to equality in personal status laws, the
American separation between religion and the state is ostensibly more protective of
women’s equality.22 However, I will show that the extensive autonomy given to
religious institutions by American law has always been detrimental to the rights of
women. Moreover, recent developments in American law and policy have strengthened the ties between religion and the state in the United States while at the same
18

See infra Section III.B; Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); see
also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
19
Tirosh, supra note 5, at 821–22.
20
For multiple examples, see generally id. See also Section IV.B.
21
On the recent changes in the United States, see Howard Gillman & Erwin Chemerinsky,
Symposium: The Unfolding Revolution in the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 6, 2020, 10:36 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/08/symposium-the-un
folding-revolution-in-the-jurisprudence-of-the-religion-clauses/ [https://perma.cc/G55G-K6M6];
Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium: The Crumbling Wall Separating Church and State, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2017, 10:18 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/symposium-crumb
ling-wall-separating-church-state/ [https://perma.cc/7LRV-5TNQ]. For previous discussions,
see, e.g., Laura Athens, Is the Wall Between Church and State Crumbling?, 81 MICH. BAR
J. 19, 19 (2002).
22
See discussion infra Section III.A.
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time extending exemptions previously reserved for religious organizations to forprofit corporations.23 These changes seriously endanger the rights of women and
further expand an already too-extensive right to the “free exercise of discrimination”
in the United States.24 Moreover, I will argue that the liberal separation between
religion and state and between the public and the private, which was intended to
protect the public sphere from private religious prejudices, has instead proven to be
a powerful breeding ground for religious prejudices that are now demanding respect
and accommodation in the public sphere and are being granted their demands
through judicial changes in church-state jurisprudence and through changes in
government policies.25 Thus, from the perspective of ensuring women’s equality, the
American relationship between religion and the state has in many respects become
as problematic as the flawed Israeli system. Consequently, the current situation
brings to mind Justice O’Connor’s famous remark in McCreary County v. ACLU of
Kentucky, where she astutely cautioned that “[t]hose who would renegotiate the
boundaries between church and state must therefore answer a difficult question:
Why would we trade a system that has served us so well for one that has served
others so poorly?”26
Furthermore, I will show that, notwithstanding the differences in religion-state
relations in the United States and Israel, there is a close resemblance in the level of
involvement of religion in the political process in the two countries and the effects
of this involvement on the rights of women. As will be discussed in detail, the
current attacks on reproductive rights in the United States and on women’s presence
in the public sphere in Israel are carried out by religious conservatives who are set
on changing the public sphere in each country to make it more religious (Christian
and Jewish, respectively).27 In the United States, the process is led by American
Christian nationalists who, rather than seeking to deepen the practice of religion in
their private lives,28 aim to infuse conservative Christianity into the American public
sphere, just as their counterparts—the Israeli Jewish religious nationalists comprised
of large parts of the Ultra-Orthodox and Religious Zionist groups in Israel—are
determined to do so in Israel.29 Both groups have the necessary political power and
legal knowledge, and are skillfully using liberal arguments to justify infusing the
23

Id.
Gila Stopler, The Free Exercise of Discrimination: Religious Liberty, Civic Community
and Women’s Equality, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 459, 462 (2004) [hereinafter The
Free Exercise of Discrimination].
25
See infra Section III.B.
26
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 883 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
27
See infra Part V.
28
ANDREW L. WHITEHEAD & SAMUEL L. PERRY, TAKING AMERICA BACK FOR GOD: CHRISTIAN NATIONALISM IN THE UNITED STATES 152–55 (Oxford Univ. Press 2020) [hereinafter
TAKING AMERICA BACK FOR GOD].
29
Id.
24
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public sphere with their private religious prejudice, dismantling the liberal protection of women’s rights.30 The combined result of an extensive interpretation of the
free exercise of religion, which allows conservative religion to grow and gain power
in the private sphere, and a massive involvement of religion in politics that translates
this power into public policy, has stripped the American separation model of any
effective means of providing protection for women’s rights against religious prejudice.
The success of the conservative strategy in the United States and in Israel hinges
on the willingness of courts and policy makers to adopt the religious conservative’s
arguments and to exempt them from the duty to respect women’s rights, when such
rights conflict with their religious beliefs.31 In both the United States and Israel, religious conservatives have gradually chipped away at the rights of women by continuously expanding the scope and meaning of the religious exemptions granted to them
in a manner that threatens to turn these individual exemptions into the general rule.32
In Part I of the Article, I will discuss the significance of maintaining control
over women’s bodies to the patriarchy and the manifestations of this control in religion and liberal society. I will claim that patriarchy manifests itself in religious as
well as in liberal society, both in the form of private and public patriarchy, and show
how control over women’s bodies is maintained and strengthened in all these arenas.
The shared need for liberal and religious patriarchal societies to control women’s
bodies facilitates the misuse of liberal concepts by religious conservatives in their
quest to undermine women’s reproductive rights and restrict their freedoms based
on modesty rules. In Part II of the Article, I will discuss the feminist critique of
political liberalism and show how liberal principles reflected in the American
constitutional and legal framework, has allowed the flourishing of patriarchal
religion, shielded it from criticism, and enabled it to gain strength in both the public
and private spheres, to an extent that threatens to undermine all the gains in women’s
equality and create a wholesale change in the liberal foundations of the state.
In Parts III and IV, I will discuss the respective religion-state relations in the
United States and Israel and claim that although the partial establishment existing
in Israel is detrimental to women’s rights, the American model of dwindling separation and expanding free exercise is similarly inimical to women’s rights, as the
general theoretical discussion of the failings of political liberalism in Part III demonstrate. In Section III.A, I will further claim that while the separation between religion
30

See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
32
One jurisdiction in which this religious conservative strategy has not been successful
to date is Canada, where the courts have resisted conservative attempts to expand religious
exemptions and to narrow down the scope of gay rights. In doing so Canadian courts have
employed a more restrictive interpretation of religious freedom than the one adopted by
American courts and have given the right to equality and fair inclusion primacy over demands
for multicultural accommodation. Trinity W. Univ. v. L. Soc’y of Upper Can., [2018] 2 S.C.R.
453 (Can.).
31
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and state is an important factor in the protection of women’s rights, two other crucial
factors are the contours of religious liberty, and discuss how, in recent years, these
factors transformed from a shield for minority religions into a sword for majority
religions. In this context, I will discuss the increasing power of religious conservatives, who are described by Whitehead and Perry as Christian Nationalists, and their
commitment to inserting Christian morality and traditional views of gender and the
family into the public sphere.33 In Section III.B, I will discuss the recent attack on
women’s right to control their bodies focusing on U.S. Supreme Court decisions on
contraceptive coverage, including Hobby Lobby, Zubik, and Little Sisters of the
Poor.34 I will describe how these decisions have radically changed religious liberty
jurisprudence to allow religious and traditional beliefs of powerful religious and
traditionalist employers to restrict the reproductive rights of women employees and
their right to control their bodies.35
In Part IV, I will present religion-state relations in Israel and show that while
religion is established in the state in the specific area of personal family law, in other
areas, liberal principles and a relatively advanced regime of protection of women’s
rights apply. I will then discuss the recent attack by politically powerful Jewish religious conservatives in Israel on women’s right to control their bodies, which leads
to restrictions on women’s presence in various parts of the public sphere through
rules and practices that constrain their actions, movements, voices, or appearances
due to their sex, for religious reasons.36 After a short description of the facts of the
Israeli case, I will present and refute the arguments raised by religious conservatives
in Israel in favor of the exclusion and segregation of women in the public sphere for
religious reasons.
Lastly, in Part V, I will compare the struggle over the segregation of women in
Israel to the struggle over women’s reproductive rights in the United States. There are
at least three points of similarity between the tactics used by religious conservatives
in Israel and the United States. First, both groups argue that anything short of an
unconditional and sweeping acceptance of their own rights claims would constitute
a grave violation of their rights. Second, both groups deny that such unconditional
acceptance of their claims would violate the rights of women. Lastly, while religious
conservatives in both Israel and the United States claim that their goal is to protect
their personal religious beliefs, conscience, or culture, an additional and unstated
goal of their efforts is to affect a wide ranging change in the legal protection afforded
to women in order to prevent them from fully exercising their equal rights.37 In this
33

See WHITEHEAD & PERRY, TAKING AMERICA BACK FOR GOD, supra note 28, at 152–54.
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S.
Ct. 1557, 1560 (2016); Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania
140 S. Ct. 2367, 2377 (2020).
35
See discussion infra Section III.B.
36
Tirosh, supra note 5, at 824.
37
In a recent article, NeJaime and Siegel argue that although religious conservatives in
34
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manner, religious conservatives in both Israel and the United States weaponize liberal
concepts in order to undermine liberal rights and restore or create a conservative
order to which they are committed.38 The use of these tactics by religious conservatives in the United States, Israel, and elsewhere, and the fact that they are accepted by
policymakers, state institutions, and courts, and are used to justify widespread restrictions on the rights of women, serves to uncover the patriarchal nature of liberalism as well as the inherent weaknesses in the liberal conceptualization of religious
freedom, freedom of conscience, multiculturalism, and equality, and the political
power of religious conservatives.
I. PATRIARCHY AND THE CONTROL OVER WOMEN’S BODIES IN
RELIGION AND IN LIBERALISM
A. Feminism and Women’s Right to Control Their Bodies
Feminist thought is highly varied and includes a range of approaches, perspectives, and explanations for women’s oppression.39 Despite their diversity, all forms
of feminist thought share a common core: “Feminism is . . . the range of committed
inquiry and activity dedicated first, to describing women’s subordination—exploring
its nature and extent; dedicated second, to asking both how—through what mechanisms, and why—for what complex and interwoven reasons—women continue to
occupy that position; and dedicated third to change.”40 According to feminists,
women’s subordination is, both historically and at present, the result of patriarchy.41
Patriarchy can be defined as “a system of social structures and practices in which men
dominate, oppress and exploit women.”42 This definition emphasizes the structural—
rather than individual—nature of patriarchy that employs social structures and social
the United States and Europe portray the conscience exemption regimes that they demand
as necessary to protect their rights as disempowered religious minorities in a pluralistic society,
these exemption regimes, far from being pluralistic, are in fact intended to enforce majoritarian norms of sexual morality that violate rights of women and gays that have only recently
and fragilely been protected by law. NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 4, at 218–19; see also Post,
supra note 4, at 473–84.
38
On the desired conservative order, see, e.g., WHITEHEAD & PERRY, TAKING AMERICA
BACK FOR GOD, supra note 28, at 121–49.
39
ROSEMARIE TONG, FEMINIST THOUGHT: A MORE COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 1–2
(2d ed. 1998). The discussion in this Section relies in part on my discussion in Gila Stopler,
Hobby Lobby, S.A.S., and the Resolution of Religion-Based Conflicts in Liberal States, 14
(4) ICON 941, 945–46, 957–59 (2016).
40
Clare Dalton, Where We Stand: Observations on the Situation of Feminist Legal Thought,
3 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 2 (1987–88).
41
See generally GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY (1986); SYLVIA WALBY,
THEORIZING PATRIARCHY (1990).
42
WALBY, supra note 41, at 20.
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practices to maintain women’s subordination to men.43 The social structures and
practices which are of interest in this Article are those that serve to restrict women’s
autonomy over their bodies. These structures and practices restrict various aspects
of women’s control over their bodies, including control over their reproductive abilities,
their sexuality and appearances, and even their presence in the public sphere.44 Thus,
for example, a legal structure that enables the subordination of women’s bodies to
the interests of men and communities is the lack of recognition, on the international
level as well as in many countries, of reproductive rights, or of a human right to safe
and legal abortion.45 This lack of recognition enables courts around the world to
affirm the denial of women’s rights to reproductive health, and to the autonomy to
decide to discontinue a pregnancy.46 A different, socio-cultural, structure that restricts
women’s autonomy and subordinates their bodies to the interests of men is the
imposition of a normative femininity upon the female body.47 Normative femininity
demands conformity to highly oppressive standards of beauty and dress, the attainment of which requires disciplinary practices—in the Foucauldian sense—such as
norms of feminine body comportment, dieting, physical exercise, hair care, skin
care, covering and uncovering, and so on.48 Importantly, these standards vary widely
between communities, from extensive exposure to thorough covering, depending on
the forms of patriarchal control exercised in each community.49
B. Patriarchy and the Control over Women’s Bodies
The control over women’s bodies and, through it, their sexuality and procreative
ability, is at the heart of patriarchy in general and patriarchal religion in particular.50
A primary manifestation of patriarchal ideology is the biblical story of Adam and
Eve, which serves as one of the founding myths of Western Civilization and has
defined the relationships between men and women on both the theoretical and practical levels in countries influenced by the Judeo-Christian tradition for generations.51
43
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According to the biblical Creation Story, after creating Adam, the man, from the
dust of the earth, God put Adam to sleep and from his rib created his mate, who Adam
then named Woman.52 After the woman was tempted by the snake to eat from the
tree of knowledge and seduced Adam into eating as well, they were both banished
from paradise and Adam renamed the woman Eve, for “she was the mother of all
living.”53 In the service of patriarchy, the creation of Eve from Adam’s rib has been
portrayed as proof of the “God-given inferiority of woman.”54 An additional justification for women’s inferiority in the Christian tradition was found in Eve’s responsibility for the fall of Adam, which was interpreted to hold all women responsible for
the advent of evil into the world.55 At the time of the writing of Genesis, the snake was
associated with the fertility goddess and symbolically represented her.56 It was the
woman’s inducement by the snake, which represents the fertility goddess and in turn
a woman’s own free sexuality, that is responsible for the Fall.57 Woman’s punishment
for her act is comprised of her eternal subjugation to her husband, the restriction of
her sexuality solely for purposes of procreation within the conjugal relationship, and
the pain of child bearing.58 In Christian thought, the woman’s role as a submissive
wife and mother is not only her punishment but also her only means of salvation.59
Thus, in the service of patriarchy, the story of Creation establishes both women’s
subservience to man and the fact that sexual intercourse, pregnancy, and childbirth
are the physical manifestations of women’s punishment for the Fall.60 Since woman’s
punishment for the Fall is both to be the vessel of man’s procreative power and to
suffer pain and sorrow while performing this role, treating women as a means for
52
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procreation becomes not only permissible but necessary and commendable.61 Viewed
this way, the story of creation provides an airtight justification for man’s superiority
over woman, his right to control her sexuality and procreative ability (and therefore
her body), and his right to possess both her and her offspring.62
Moreover, for American Christian nationalists, maintaining the proper roles for
men and women within the family is not only a personal religious commitment
mandated by the story of the Fall, but an essential national goal because “[t]hreats
to the ‘traditional’ (patriarchal, heterosexual, nuclear) family are not just the symptoms of sin in a fallen world.63 They are threats to the very fabric of American
society.”64 As will be further discussed in this Article, the solution for these threats,
according to American Christian nationalists, is the political reinforcement of the
godly order through national policy and legislation.65
Importantly, the myth of Adam and Eve, with its implications for man’s right
to control woman, her sexuality, her procreative ability, and her body, has had profound effects not only on religious thought, but also on the development of liberal
theory.66 While classical liberalism is based on a voluntary social contract between
free and equal men, it is simultaneously predicated on Adam’s dominion over Eve
and Eve’s role as submissive wife and mother.67 Thus, one of the core elements of
classical liberalism is the division between the public political sphere, in which men
participate and contract as free and equal persons, and the private familial sphere,
in which paternal power is maintained and women are kept in a state of subjection
that is perceived as natural and extraneous to the public political sphere.68 Unlike in
classical patriarchalism, in which the personal was the basis for the political (the
paternal power of the father was the basis for his political right, and hence the basis
for a society established on natural hierarchy), in liberalism, the personal is severed
from the political in order to allow the personal to continue to be predicated on
natural hierarchy.69 Men’s right to keep women subordinated in the private sphere
while keeping the public sphere of freedom and equality for themselves is justified
by Locke on the basis of the order of God and of the laws of nature70 and is predicated
on Adam’s dominion over Eve and on Eve’s submissive role as wife and mother.71
61
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In the past this right was best exemplified by the notorious doctrine of coverture that
has defined married women as a legal nonentity well into the end of the nineteenth
century and has prevented their entry into and participation in the public sphere.72
Even after the elimination of coverture many of the notions underlying this institution
have remained, and women’s subordination within liberal states is maintained through
the use of new juridical forms such as the invocation of privacy.73
Moreover, the entrance of women into the public sphere in the Twentieth century
has brought about a transformation within patriarchy and a significant move from
private patriarchy towards public patriarchy.74 In private patriarchy, the individual
father or husband is the direct oppressor and the beneficiary of the subordination of
the women in his household, and his continued power is ensured through the complete
exclusion of women from the public sphere.75 In public patriarchy women are no
longer excluded from public arenas, but are segregated and subordinated within the
public sphere and their expropriation is performed by the collective.76
The shift from private to public patriarchy has been evident in many domains,
including reproduction and sexuality.77 One of the markers of modernization has
been the shift, starting in the nineteenth century and culminating in the twentieth
century, in control over births from female midwives to male doctors.78 Conflicts
over reproduction have involved not only women and medical professionals, but
also churches and eugenicists.79 Thus, in the nineteenth century United States, doctors
used religious understandings of women’s roles to advance their claim that the
community has the right and the duty to control procreation through the medical
72
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profession.80 Similarly, in the United States and elsewhere, eugenicists have advocated giving low-class women access to contraception and abortion in order to
enhance the quality of the human race and the nation.81 To this day, abortions, even
in the first trimester, are regulated and subject to restrictions and prohibitions in
many countries, including the United States; so are birth control pills and most other
female means of contraception.82 Thus, the existing structure of public patriarchy
within liberal states, even when allegedly separated from religion, constitutes a firm
basis upon which religious conservatives can reassert the right of religious patriarchy to control women’s bodies and sexuality.
The exclusion and segregation of women in the public sphere in Israel is another
poignant example of the penetration of private patriarchy into the public sphere and
the deepening of public, allegedly secular, patriarchy in the service of religious
private patriarchy.83 The notion of women’s modesty has been used for decades by
religious conservatives to socialize religious women to confine themselves to the
private sphere and bow their heads to the authority of men, viewing themselves as
incapable of making important decisions without the direction of their husbands and
spiritual leaders.84 This same notion is utilized by the secular state, as an allegedly
neutral, non-religious excuse, to restrict women’s presence in the public sphere,
segregate them, and even to exclude them altogether from areas where the state
gives precedence to the presence of religious men over the presence of women, such
as the army.85
Importantly, women’s bodies and their dress code, which are strictly regulated
in conservative religions, are similarly regulated in the liberal state. In both instances,
women’s bodies, dressed and undressed, are objectified and used to serve individual
as well as collective male interests.86 The same objectification of women’s bodies
which entails covering them in religious private patriarchy leads to their complete
uncovering on billboards and in pornography, and to the enforcement of a strict
beauty code in western liberal public patriarchy.87 As the exclusion and segregation
80
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of women in the public sphere in Israel shows, the objectification of women’s bodies
that leads to their uncovering on billboards in liberal states can lead to their covering,
segregation, and exclusion from the public sphere in the same states as long as they
continue to sanction and protect patriarchy.88
II. THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM
The feminist critique of liberalism goes beyond a critique of its general patriarchal
origins to an analysis of the way in which liberal concepts maintain and promote a
patriarchal state structure that preserves, normalizes, and masks the subordination
of women.89 Thus, feminists are critical of the extensive use of the public-private
distinction within liberalism and have often claimed that it is being used to shield
bigotry and exploitation.90
In this section, I will focus on the principles of political liberalism, which to a
large extent reflect the practice of most liberal democracies, including the United
States and, to a large extent, Israel, and claim that the liberal choice to allow the
flourishing of bigotry and intolerance in the private sphere and require respect for
equality only in the public sphere, has allowed religious conservatives to make use
of liberal concepts to restrict, rather than protect, the rights of women, making the
status and rights of women in society exceedingly vulnerable.91
The feminist claim against liberalism holds that by insisting certain social structures, actions, and ideologies are part of an inviolable private sphere within which
almost no state involvement should be tolerated, liberals have often been too quick
to free themselves from the obligation to critique unjust and discriminatory aspects of
such structures, actions, or ideologies, and allow their unhindered existence and
growth.92 The outcome has been particularly damaging for women, whose entire existence has, for a long time, been relegated to the private sphere, and who continue
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to disproportionally bear the brunt of the subordination and exploitation prevalent
in this sphere.93 Two central modern liberal theories consolidating and expanding
the public-private distinction and the immunity it generates to structures, actions, or
ideologies attributed to the private sphere have been political liberalism and liberal
multiculturalism.94 While the latter is specifically concerned with shielding minority
cultures from the corrosive influence of majoritarian liberal society, the former is
engaged with finding a general liberal framework within which the peaceful coexistence of liberal, non-liberal, and illiberal comprehensive doctrines can be guaranteed.95 Despite their different foci, both theories are highly accommodationist
towards non-liberal and illiberal comprehensive doctrines, and liberal multiculturalism even calls on the liberal state to provide proactive assistance to illiberal minority
cultures, garnering feminist criticism for doing so.96 A common denominator among
the religious conservative groups in the United States and Israel is that they are
majoritarian.97 Consequently, my analysis in this section will focus mainly on the
feminist critique of political liberalism and its implications for political liberalism’s
ability to protect women from majoritarian religious conservative prejudice. However, because claims in support of the segregation of women in the public sphere in
Israel rely, among other things, on the portrayal of the ultra-orthodox in Israel as a
minority community and the exclusion and segregation of women as a necessary
multicultural accommodation, I will discuss and refute this claim separately in
Section IV.C.4 below.
In his book Political Liberalism, which has become the blueprint for many liberal
theorists and policymakers, John Rawls introduced a new variant of liberalism—
political liberalism.98 Rawls argues that political, rather than comprehensive, liberalism
is the appropriate political theory for modern heterogeneous democratic societies in
which a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines exist.99 The purpose of political liberalism, according
93
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to Rawls, is to lay out the framework for a constitutional democratic regime that will
enable citizens who embrace reasonable and incompatible comprehensive doctrines
to live together and maintain, over time, a stable and just society of free and equal
citizens.100 Accordingly, Rawls proposes a political and constitutional framework
within which, he hopes, “deeply opposed though reasonable comprehensive doctrines may live together and all affirm the political conception of a constitutional
regime.”101 Put differently, in his vision for liberal democracies Rawls attempts to
formulate a liberal political and constitutional conception that religious, non-liberal,
and even illiberal doctrines may be able to endorse.102 While this attempt was enthusiastically embraced by many liberal thinkers, feminists have, from early on, been
suspicious of the ability of a political and constitutional structure that grants extensive leeway and respect to non-liberal and illiberal doctrines to live up to its promise
of maintaining over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens.103
One of the most insightful feminist critics of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice and
later, of his Political Liberalism, has been Susan Okin.104 Okin, along with other
feminists, pointed out early on that in A Theory of Justice Rawls omits sex from the
list of personal characteristics that are veiled from those in the original position, and
that he specifies that those who reason in the original position are all “heads of
families”.105 By doing so, Okin argued, Rawls is ignoring the social institution of
gender and the sexual division of labor in the household, as well as their unequal
and unjust effects on girls and women.106 Furthermore, she observed “the questions
of whether and how the family, in its traditional or any other form, is a just social
institution and how or whether it translates the principles of justice into social
practice are never raised.”107 Okin noted that this was particularly disturbing since
Rawls acknowledges that the family plays a prominent role in the moral development
of citizens, and his account of the development of a sense of justice that he considers
essential to the stability of a just society relies heavily on the justness of families.108
However, if many families are not truly just, and teach their members intolerance
and exploitation of women, then how can children whose moral development takes
life, ideals of personal character, friendship, familial and associational relationships, and other
aspects that inform our conduct and even our life as a whole. Id. at 13.
100
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place in these families become just citizens who embrace unreservedly the political
equality of the sexes or any other forms of political equality?
The feminist critique of liberalism’s failure to address discrimination and injustice
in the private sphere has extended well beyond the family and gender relations.109
Following the publication of Political Liberalism, this critique expanded to include
the theory’s fundamental distinction between the political sphere and the non-political
sphere and the resulting protection, and even legitimation, it grants to almost all
sexist and otherwise intolerant comprehensive doctrines.110 In a nutshell, the crux
of the problem with political liberalism lies in its organizing principle, which is the
formulation of a liberal political conception of justice that is thin enough to gain the
endorsement of religious, non-liberal, illiberal, and comprehensive doctrines, but at
the same time supposedly thick enough to protect the rights of all citizens as free
and equal.111 If successful, it aspires to maintain, over time, an overlapping consensus between citizens in which all citizens commit to a liberal political conception of
justice, although some of them, and perhaps many of them, simultaneously affirm
comprehensive doctrines that are non-liberal and even illiberal.112 The impossibility
of this aspiration has been clear to feminists from early on. There are two major
errors in the theory of political liberalism and in the practice on which it is based and
for which it advocates.113 Its first error is that through its use of concepts such as
reasonable comprehensive doctrines, reasonable overlapping consensus, impartiality
and the idea of public reason, it effectively shields illiberal doctrines from criticism,
allowing them to flourish and acquire legitimation, and provides insufficient protection to the rights of citizens as free and equal.114 Its second error is that it is naïve,
and indeed misguided, to assume that citizens who adhere to non-liberal and illiberal
comprehensive doctrines will simultaneously develop a genuine commitment to a
liberal political conception of justice.115
I will briefly elaborate on political liberalism’s two errors, starting with the
looseness of its concepts and continuing with its misguided assumptions. Political
liberalism’s concept of a reasonable comprehensive doctrine is deliberately wide and
loose.116 In order to count as reasonable, a doctrine need only be a more or less
109
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coherent and consistent exercise of theoretical, as well as practical, reason, that draws
on a tradition of thought, and is stable over time but still open to change for reasons
that it views as good and sufficient.117 The only comprehensive doctrines that Rawls
finds unreasonable are doctrines that do not endorse some form of liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; doctrines that support egregious violations of
rights, such as slavery in ancient Athens or the antebellum South; and doctrines that
espouse certain kinds of religious fundamentalism.118 As Okin points out of Rawls’
account, religions that both preach and practice highly sexist modes of life are all
seen as reasonable. Since the basic texts of Judaism, Christianity and Islam are all
“rife with sexism,” and orthodox forms of these religions “still discriminate against
women and reinforce their subordination within religious practices, and within and
outside the family, in numerous significant ways,” many of the doctrines that Rawls
views as reasonable and legitimate are in fact illiberal doctrines that do not view
women as free and equal persons.119 Moreover, according to Rawls, illiberal comprehensive doctrines, both religious and non-religious, that advocate gender, sexual
orientation, racial, and religious discrimination, would still count as reasonable as
long as they are willing to accept the liberal political conception of justice.120
Another important concept in political liberalism that serves to buttress the
power and legitimacy of illiberal doctrines is impartiality. Impartiality requires political liberals not to attack, criticize, or reject any comprehensive doctrine defined as
reasonable or any of the views expressed in it.121 Rawls explains that since the
judgments rendered by these doctrines are seen as internal and non-political, they
need not be based on public reason and can only be evaluated from within the
doctrines themselves.122 Thus, political liberals remain impartial even in the face of
egregiously sexist and racist views expressed by comprehensive doctrines, as long
as these views do not directly shape decisions regarding constitutional essentials and
questions of basic justice.123 Only decisions of this latter kind must be supported by
reasons that are compatible with public reason and with the political values expressed by a political liberal conception of justice.124 Decisions of this kind must
therefore be justified in ways that all citizens, as free and equal, are able to endorse
in light of their own reason.125
However, even this narrow protection for citizen’s rights is easy to bypass, since
almost any reason internal to a particularistic comprehensive doctrine can be expressed
117
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120
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in terms that disguise its particularistic origins and that are compatible with public
reason. An important example concerning abortion is the U.S. Supreme Court case
Harris v. McRae, in which a challenge was made to the Hyde Amendment, a funding
restriction that prohibits federal funding of abortions for Medicaid recipients except
when the continuation of the pregnancy would endanger the woman’s life.126 The
plaintiffs in McRae argued that the Hyde Amendment was a violation of the Establishment Clause (and in Rawlsian terms, of the idea of public reason) because it
codified the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church with regard to abortions.127
The Supreme Court rejected this argument on the ground that the fact that the law
happens to coincide with the teachings of a certain religion does not lead to a violation of the Establishment Clause as long as there is a legitimate secular purpose
for the law.128 Beyond the court’s intentional failure to take notice of the connection
between the law and Roman Catholic teachings, the secular purpose that the Court
found is particularly instructive. According to the Court, denying federal funding for
abortions is not an establishment of religion because “[t]he Hyde amendment . . . is
as much a reflection of ‘traditionalist’ values towards abortion, as it is an embodiment of the views of any particular religion.”129
McRae is but one example of how easily particularistic religious comprehensive
doctrines can be disguised as traditionalist, non-religious, public reason and legislated into law, even in countries which allegedly maintain strict separation between
religion and the state.130 Scholars researching traditionalists and conservative religious
actors, such as the Catholic Church and traditionalists within Russian Orthodox
Christianity, have argued that while these religious actors translate religious arguments into secular arguments, they do so only strategically in order to influence the
public debate and push forward a thoroughly anti-liberal agenda, while at the same
time remaining closed to any possibility of change in their own positions.131 For
example, in order to advance laws that prohibit blasphemy, these traditionalists will
refrain from invoking the fourth commandment that prohibits taking the name of the
lord in vain.132 Instead, they will offer the harm to the integrity of individual religious believers as a secular justification that may restrict blasphemous speech within
a liberal political conception.133 However, their use of this argument will be purely
126
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strategic and will not indicate any genuine willingness to be open to other perspectives on the matter.134 Thus, political liberalism’s first error has long allowed nonliberal and illiberal comprehensive doctrines to flourish and gain strength in liberal
societies, and use that strength, in both the private and the public spheres, to restrict
the rights of women and other disempowered groups.135
Political liberalism’s second error is its naïve, and indeed misguided, assumption that citizens who adhere to non-liberal and illiberal comprehensive doctrines
will simultaneously develop a genuine commitment to a political liberal conception
of justice.136 The recent rise of right-wing religious and nationalist populism in many
parts of the world, including the United States and Israel, which have successfully
mobilized religious and nationalist illiberal groups against the liberal state, has
clearly exposed the frailty of the extant political liberal framework.137 Rawls’ aspiration to persuade adherents of non-liberal and illiberal comprehensive doctrines
to develop a genuine commitment to a political liberal conception of justice is embodied in political liberalism’s concept of a reasonable overlapping consensus.138
Rawls believes that a reasonable overlapping consensus over a shared political
liberal conception of justice can be reached when “the political conception is supported by the reasonable though opposing religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines
that gain a significant body of adherents and endure over time from one generation
to the next.”139
However, Rawls concedes that his theory of political liberalism cannot prove,
and does not even attempt to prove, that the reasonable overlapping consensus on
which the successful realization of the theory is predicated will indeed form around
a political liberal conception of justice in any given setting.140 Thus, he explains, the
most political liberalism does is “present a freestanding liberal political conception
that does not oppose comprehensive doctrines on their own ground and does not
preclude the possibility of an overlapping consensus for the right reasons.”141
134
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Moreover, he acknowledges that while achieving an overlapping consensus may be
theoretically possible, under many historical conditions, efforts to achieve it may be
overwhelmed by the success of unreasonable doctrines, and consequently, the attempt
to formulate an overlapping consensus will fail.142 In my view such failure is an almost
inevitable result of Rawls’ wide definition of reasonable comprehensive doctrines,
and that many of the doctrines which he defines as reasonable are doctrines that
cannot realistically be expected to embrace a political liberal conception of justice.
Despite his acknowledgment that maintaining an overlapping consensus of a
political liberal conception of justice over time is not guaranteed, Rawls bases his
entire theory on the success of such an endeavor.143 He acknowledges that if the initial
acquiescence to a political liberal conception as a modus vivendi is, over generations,
to turn into a stable and enduring overlapping consensus, “a certain looseness in our
comprehensive views, as well as their being not fully, but only partially comprehensive, may be particularly significant.”144 He hopes that when citizens whose views are
loose and only partially comprehensive are faced with an incompatibility “between the
political conception and their comprehensive doctrines, then they might very well
adjust or revise the latter rather than reject the political conception.”145 This “liberal
expectancy”—the expectation that illiberal doctrines would liberalize over time
upon realizing the advantages of liberalism over illiberalism—is shared by other
liberal theorists such as Will Kymlicka and Nancy Rosenblum, and serves as a basis
for their respective theories of liberal multiculturalism and the appropriate relations
between the liberal state and private associations.146 Unfortunately, liberal expectancy
seems overly optimistic, and there is no empirical evidence to support it.147
Furthermore, Rawls’ reliance on the looseness and incompleteness of comprehensive doctrines ignores the fact that, in many liberal democracies, significant parts
of the population adhere to fully comprehensive illiberal doctrines (mostly, but not
only, religious) that are neither loose nor incomplete, and resist any internal liberalization and even work diligently—often successfully—to resist and reverse liberalization of state laws in areas like women’s reproductive rights or LGBTQ+ rights.148
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Another way of phrasing this problem was suggested by Stoeckl who argues that
Rawls implicitly assumes that there are only two kinds of religious doctrines—
fundamentalist doctrines, which are the minority and are unreasonable and therefore
shunned, and all remaining religious doctrines which he designates as reasonable and
implicitly assumes that they are all liberal doctrines (at least in the sense that they
willingly adopt a political liberal conception of justice that treats all citizens as free
and equal).149 Stoeckl argues that the empirical study of religious actors reveals that
there is a third group of religious actors which she calls “traditionalists.”150 Traditionalists are not fundamentalists, and therefore they are not shunned either by political
liberalism or by society.151 However, at the same time, traditionalists are unwilling to
adopt a political liberal conception of justice which treats all citizens as free and equal,
and they use their extensive political power, both internally within states and internationally, to change the consensus over the appropriate conception of justice in society.152
Importantly, the religious resurgence across the world in recent decades has been
characterized by increased support for such traditionalist religious groups coupled with
a parallel decline in more moderate religious groups.153 I would argue that political
liberalism’s designation of almost all comprehensive doctrines as reasonable and its
failure to take into account the many religious traditionalist groups, as well as many
non-religious illiberal groups, that are all committed to shifting the overlapping
consensus towards non-liberal conceptions of justice, makes it far too optimistic with
regard to the ability to maintain a stable and just society of free and equal citizens
over time. As Yael Tamir has rightly argued in the context of debates around multiculturalism, the most that can be expected from illiberal communities is to agree
strategically to maintain a modus vivendi within a political liberal structure in order
to protect their own status and rights.154 However, once illiberal communities obtain
enough power to challenge and change the political liberal structure to their own
149
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advantage they will do so, since “[t]he compromise from the point of view of the
illiberal community is not even a principled modus vivendi, based on a ‘live and let
live’, but a conditional one which is based on fear rather than respect.”155 This
important insight is all the more true with respect to non-liberal and illiberal religious and nationalist majoritarian groups who have no incentive to accept a liberal
modus vivendi, since their own rights are never in any serious danger.156 Moreover,
by strategically using their aggregate political power, these groups have the ability
to redesign the public and institutional spheres and restrict the rights of others.157
This is precisely what we are witnessing religious conservatives do successfully in
the United States and in Israel.158
III. RELIGION, LAW, AND POLITICS AND THEIR IMPACT ON
WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Religion, Law, and Politics in the United States
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.”159 These clauses have been interpreted as requiring “a wall between church
and state.”160 This wall of separation between religion and state has, for many years,
been seen as embodying two distinct commitments. First, separation has been construed as prohibiting any direct state funding for religious activities and placement
of religious symbols on government property in a way that may indicate governmental
preference of a certain religion.161 Second, while the First Amendment has been understood as preventing the government from giving direct aid or preference to religion,
it has also been interpreted as preventing any governmental restrictions on the religious
liberty of adherents and religious institutions.162 Importantly, while the combination
155
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of some degree of both separation between religion and the state and respect for
religious freedom is prevalent in liberal states, the degree of non-establishment and
the extent of religious freedom granted to religious organizations and individuals
vary from country to country, and these variations can have important implications
for civil rights in general and for the rights of women in particular.163
There are several reasons why the American separation model has not provided
adequate protection to women’s rights against religious bigotry over the years. First,
the U.S. Constitution is generally understood to preclude the imposition of norms
ensuring equality for women on religious entities, due to the supremacy of the freedoms
guaranteed by the First Amendment.164 An early example of how the separation
model can serve as a shield for injustice is the McClure v. Salvation Army case.165
In McClure, the Fifth Circuit held that the Free Exercise Clause precluded the court’s
intervention in a suit filed by an ordained minister of The Salvation Army, who
alleged that she received a lower salary and fewer benefits than her male counterparts and was fired after she complained to the EEOC.166 The Salvation Army did
not claim, and the court did not hold, that the discrimination against McClure was
based on religious precepts.167 Further, despite the fact that it seems highly unlikely
that the discrimination in salary and benefits against women clergy was religiously
based, the Salvation Army was not required to offer any reasons for the alleged
discrimination because the court held that the First Amendment prohibits any state
involvement in ecclesiastical matters such as the relationship between a church and
its ministers.168 Importantly, the court’s decision was not based on the integrity of
the religious message of The Salvation Army, or on the deeply held religious beliefs
exempts religious institutions from complying with antidiscrimination laws concerning employment decisions, when employees perform some religious function, even when their primary
functions are secular. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC,
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of the members of the church. What the McClure court defended in its decision was
merely the right of the existing leadership of the church to make decisions and take
actions with impunity, even when such actions involved otherwise unlawful discrimination, regardless of whether these actions were religiously motivated or compatible with the wishes of members of the church.169
Even as the ties between religion and the state have become much closer, the
understanding that the First Amendment precludes the imposition of norms ensuring
women’s equality on religious entities has expanded over the years. Moreover, the
classical paradigm of separation between religion and the state has been replaced by
a paradigm of state neutrality towards religion,170 and later by preferential treatment
of religions, especially Christianity.171 This new paradigm has been expressed through
various normative and legal constructs such as “Judeo-Christian tolerance,”172 “special
solicitude to the rights of religious organizations,”173 freedom of the church, new
religious institutionalism, and corporate religious liberty.174
Under the neutrality model, religious institutions are no different than any other
institution and should be treated as such by the state.175 Thus, this model entails
neutrality between religion and non-religion and not merely neutrality between the
different religions.176 Though the shift to state neutrality towards religion should
have been conducive to the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws on religious
institutions, such enforcement has become even less likely in the era of neutrality
than it was in the era of strict separation.177 At the same time, government funds that
169
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were once given only to non-religious institutions are increasingly granted to religious
institutions as well.178 Thus, the combined result of the reluctance to interfere with
religious beliefs on the one hand, and the push for neutrality towards religion in terms
of funding on the other has been the further legitimization of religiously motivated
discrimination against women and the use of government money to support it.179
In her important article, The Politics of Women’s Wrongs and the Bill of “Rights,”
Mary Becker observes that there has never been a real separation between religion
and the state in the United States, nor has there been government neutrality towards
religion.180 Instead, she claims, government has always advanced religion by granting
it substantial subsidies in the form of exemptions from income and property taxes,
and awards of government contracts.181 As Becker rightly points out, by subsidizing
religion and increasing its power through the grant of government contracts, the
government magnifies religion’s subordinating effects on women.182 This observation has become even more true over the years. Charitable choice and school
voucher programs have enabled patriarchal religions to further enhance their power
and to spread their subordinating teachings concerning women’s proper role to an
ever-increasing audience.183 Moreover, by supplying patriarchal religion with
government funds, the government implicitly, if not explicitly, sanctions subordinating teachings, especially by supporting programs that use the religious view about
women’s and men’s roles as a remedial tool and funding religious schools that teach
the subordination of women.184 Nevertheless, support for such schools and programs
have increased over the years, and in its recent Espinoza decision, the Supreme Court
practically imposed an expansion of the grant of government money to religious
schools by deciding that a state that gives tax credits to parents who send their children
Court’s reasoning, which was not supported by the Smith holding itself, was that the Smith
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to secular private schools is mandated by the Free Exercise Clause to give the same
amount of tax credit to parents who send their children to religious schools.185
Furthermore, while the Court is sidestepping the Establishment Clause and
insisting that religion should be treated equally in government funding, it is extending
preferential treatment to religion on the basis of the Free Exercise Clause.186 In
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, the Supreme
Court unanimously held that both churches and affiliated organizations, such as
religious schools, can assert a “ministerial exception” to prevent the application of
antidiscrimination laws, including the Americans with Disabilities Act, to decisions on
hiring and firing religious leaders.187 In the recent Our Lady of Guadalupe School case,
the Court expanded the exception for religious schools even further to cover all teachers
regardless of their religious leadership role.188 Thus, the same religious schools that
are granted government money through parental tax credits in the name of equal treatment, are also granted a license to discriminate against teachers with impunity.189
There are at least five facets of the relationship between religion and the state
in contemporary democracies that are crucial to an understanding of the ways in
which religion affects the state and the rights of its citizens, particularly women: (1)
the institutional differentiation between religion and the state; (2) the level of
protection of religious liberty; (3) the extent of religious involvement in education
and social services; (4) the involvement of religion in politics; and (5) the levels of
religious belief of individuals in society.190 Until now, the discussion in this part has
185
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covered the first three facets and has shown how American law has gradually changed
to become more accommodating toward religion, allowing it to gain more power,
resources, and autonomy.191 However, these changes cannot be fully understood and
would not have transpired without the increasing involvement of religion in American
politics and political mobilization of religious adherents to the goal of strengthening
the public role of religion in the country. In their important book, Taking America
Back for God, sociologists Whitehead and Perry claim that the recent religious
conservative turn in the United States is driven by a religious nationalist conservative ideology which they term “Christian nationalism.”192 Whitehead and Perry
define American Christian nationalism as an ideology “that idealizes and advocates
a fusion of Christianity with American civic life.”193 According to their analysis,
American Christian nationalists are not necessarily deeply religious people that want
to deepen the practice of religion in their private lives.194 Rather, they may belong
to both religious and non-religious groups, which are bound together by the desire
to see religion, and specifically a particular ethnocultural strain of Christianity, privileged in the public sphere in the United States.195 Americans who embrace Christian
nationalist views to varying degrees comprise more than half of the population, and
“Christian nationalism is influential across the entire [American] population.”196
Whitehead and Perry argue that “Christian nationalist ideology is fundamentally
focused on gaining and maintaining access to power. It seeks to ensure that one particular group, with a specific vision for the country, enjoys privileged access to the halls
of power and has the ability to make the culture in its own image.”197 In order to do
so, American Christian nationalists have firmly supported president Trump, and he
rewarded them with executive and policy decisions that have promoted their vision
by turning the Supreme Court into a conservative stronghold and restricting women’s
reproductive rights.198 While approval of Christian nationalism is a strong predictor
191
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of various anti-liberal stances such as racial intolerance, ethnocentrism, right-wing
authoritarianism, and populism, the most important stances in the context of this
Article, for which Christian nationalism is a predictor, are sexism and traditional views
of gender and family.199 According to Whitehead and Perry “Christian nationalism
advocates for a particular social order that lionizes hierarchies between men and
women.”200 The society that strong Christian nationalists wish to live in—whether
they are theologically conservative Christians or not—is a society in which families are
“traditional,” and men and women are in their “proper place.”201 Consequently, “embracing Christian nationalism is the strongest predictor of espousing a more traditional
gender ideology for Americans, net of their religious and political characteristics.”202
Because Christian nationalism is political at its core, it views threats to the
traditional family as “threats to the very fabric of American society” and its adherents see as a vital part of the solution to these threats the political reinforcement of
the gendered godly order.203 Christian nationalism is, according to Whitehead and
Perry, “ultimately about privilege,”204 and Christian nationalists are “seeking to
retain or gain power in the public sphere” and are cloaking their political and social
ends in the transcendent.205 Thus, “Christian nationalism is used to defend against
shifts in the culture toward equality for groups that have historically lacked access
to the levers of power—women, sexual, racial, ethnic, and religious minorities.”206
Whitehead and Perry argue that “politicians at all levels of federal, state, and local
governments use Christian nationalism to engender support and advocate for their
particular vision for America.”207 One example is Project Blitz, an initiative created
by a coalition of groups on the Christian right under the leadership of the Congressional Prayer Caucus Foundation that offers model legislation promoting and
sometimes even imposing Christian nationalist interpretations of Christian values
at the local, state, and federal levels.208 The attack on women’s reproductive rights
B.U. L. REV. 2413, 2415, 2419 (2020); ISABELLA ABELITE, EVELYN MICHALOS, & JOHN ROQUE,
PROTECTING THE SUPREME COURT: WHY SAFEGUARDING THE JUDICIARY’S INDEPENDENCE
IS CRUCIAL TO MAINTAINING ITS LEGITIMACY, 1 (Fordham Univ. Sch. L., Jan. 2021), https://
ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/1112 [https://perma.cc/8RE3-K4R4].
199
WHITEHEAD & PERRY, TAKING AMERICA BACK FOR GOD, supra note 28, at 13;
Whitehead & Perry, Is a “Christian America” a More Patriarchal America?, supra note
198, at 152.
200
WHITEHEAD & PERRY, TAKING AMERICA BACK FOR GOD, supra note 28, at 17.
201
Id. at 152–54.
202
Whitehead & Perry, Is a “Christian America” a More Patriarchal America?, supra
note 198, at 153.
203
WHITEHEAD & PERRY, TAKING AMERICA BACK FOR GOD, supra note 28, at 148.
204
Id. at 153.
205
Id.
206
Id. at 153–54.
207
Id. at 159.
208
Id. For the website of the initiative, see http://cpcfoundation.com/first-freedom-coali
tion-project-blitz/ [https://perma.cc/J8LV-DFCW].
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discussed in this Article is orchestrated and carried out by conservative politicians,
legislatures, and even judges who share the Christian nationalist agenda.209
B. The Recent Attack on Women’s Reproductive Rights in the United States
The obvious starting point for a survey of the recent attack on women’s reproductive rights in the United States is the Hobby Lobby case.210 The Hobby Lobby
case involved closely held corporations that were required by federal regulations
issued by the American Department of Health and Human Resources (HHS) under
the ACA to provide their employees with health insurance coverage for certain
methods of contraception.211 Owners of the corporations claimed that the regulations
violate their sincerely held religious beliefs and should therefore be struck down.212
The case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled for the corporations and struck
down what has come to be known as the “contraceptive mandate”213 contained in the
regulations, holding that the contraceptive mandate violated the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA).214 The RFRA is a federal law that was passed by Congress
in 1993 following the Supreme Court’s Smith decision.215 The RFRA prohibits the government from substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion, even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government can show the
application of the burden to the person is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest and is the least restrictive means for furthering that interest.216 The application
of the RFRA to the contraceptive mandate raised four questions: (1) Can for-profit
209

See infra Section III.B.
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 682 (2014).
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
It is important to note that the appellation “contraceptive mandate” is a misnomer
because the ACA offers all employers a choice between paying a tax to the government
(similarly to the Social Security tax) that would subsidize the government’s provision of
health care to employees and providing their employees directly with a comprehensive health
insurance plan (that must also include contraceptive coverage). Nevertheless, the majority
chose to treat it as a real mandate. See id. at 733–35. For a detailed analysis see Marty
Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part III—There Is No “Employer Mandate”, BALKINIZATION BLOG
(Dec. 16, 2013, 9:36 AM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobby-lobby-part-iiitheres
-no-employer.html [https://perma.cc/37UF-7RXQ].
214
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq.
215
Id.; Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872
(1990). In Smith, two members of the Native American Church were dismissed from their jobs
and denied unemployment benefits because they ingested peyote as an essential element of a
religious ceremony. Id. at 872. Oregon law included a general rule forbidding the consumption
of peyote, and the Smith Court rejected the employees’ claim that the denial of unemployment
benefits violated their free exercise rights, holding that the First Amendment is not violated
when a prohibition of the exercise of religion is merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid law. Id. at 878.
216
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq.
210
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corporations be considered persons who exercise religion?217 (2) Does the contraceptive mandate substantially burden the corporations’ religious exercise?218 (3) Is the
contraceptive mandate in furtherance of a compelling government interest?219 (4)
Does the mandate represent the least restrictive means for furthering that interest?220
The majority of the Supreme Court held that for-profit corporations can be
considered persons under the RFRA, and that the contraceptive mandate substantially burdens their religious exercise.221 The majority further decided to assume
without adjudicating that “the interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the four
challenged contraceptive methods is compelling within the meaning of RFRA,” but
held that the contraceptive mandate was not the least restrictive means of furthering
this compelling interest and was therefore incompatible with RFRA.222 The four
minority justices rejected the majority’s decision as well as its reasoning.223 The
minority reasoned that the contraceptive mandate does not substantially burden the
petitioners’ religious exercise, that it serves a compelling governmental interest, and
that it is the least restrictive means to achieve that interest.224 Consequently, the four
minority justices found that the contraceptive mandate was constitutional and that
the challenge to it should be rejected.225
In a forceful dissent, Justice Ginsburg referred to the majority opinion as being of
“startling breadth” and as deviating considerably from prior American free-exercise
jurisprudence.226 Ginsburg pointed to three important deviations. First, for the first
time the Court decided that for-profit corporations may be entitled to protection of
their free exercise of religion.227 Second, to hold that the mandate substantially
burdens their religion without requiring any further showing, the Court relied solely
on the corporations’ owners’ statement that the contraceptive mandate is incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs.228 Third, the Court decided that where
an enterprise claims a religion-based exemption and the government can assume the
cost of the exemption in lieu of the enterprise, there exists a “less restrictive means”
to achieve the compelling governmental interest, regardless of the additional cost to
the public and despite the additional burden placed on the enterprise’s employees.229
217

Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 705.
Id. at 719.
219
Id. at 726.
220
Id. at 728–31.
221
Id. at 706–07.
222
Id. at 726–31.
223
Id. at 739–40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
224
Id. at 768 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
225
Id. at 740 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 739–40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
227
Id. at 751–52 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
228
Id. at 758–60 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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The additional burden on the employees would require them to “take steps to learn
about, and to sign up for, a new [government funded and administered] health benefit,” and
218

2022]

FROM PRIVATE PREJUDICE TO PUBLIC POLICY

721

This, Ginsburg noted, goes against Court precedent on free exercise claims since
“with respect to free exercise claims no less than free speech claims, ‘[y]our right
to swing your arms ends just where the other man’s nose begins.’”230 Contrary to
Justice Ginsburg, some commentators read the majority opinion as agreeing to the
principle that free exercise claims should not be accepted if they cause third-party
harm, while differing from the minority only in their assessment of whether any
harm was suffered by third parties in the case at hand.231
Just several days after deciding the Hobby Lobby case, the Supreme Court further
extended the religious exemptions from the contraceptive coverage requirement
when it granted an injunction pending appeal to the religious non-profit Wheaton
College based on its demand to be granted an exemption from the exemption.232 The
College argued that even taking the necessary steps to request an exemption from the
contraceptive coverage requirement constitutes a substantial burden on its religious
freedom since by requesting the exemption it triggers someone else’s duty to provide
the contraceptives to its students/employees.233 The majority of the Court enjoined
the government from requiring religious non-profit organizations to fill out a two page
form in order to receive the exemption from the contraceptive coverage requirement
pending appeal.234 In a scathing dissent, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg
and Kagan, pointed out that in its decision, the Court is enjoining the precise procedure which a few days earlier, in Hobby Lobby, it described as the proper alternative to the contraceptive mandate while explaining that it “constitutes an alternative
that achieves all of the Government’s aims while providing greater respect for religious
liberty.”235 After striking down the contraceptive mandate based on the existence of
this alternative means, the Court went ahead and gave an interim order enjoining the
government from requiring employers to use it, allegedly accepting prima facie the
plaintiffs’ argument that it likely places an unjust substantial burden on their sincere
religious beliefs.236 Similarly, in Zubik v. Burwell, where plaintiffs were primarily
non-profit organizations that provide health insurance to their employees, the Court
to hope that the scarce funds allocated by the government for safety-net family-planning
services, which are only aimed at covering the needs of uninsured individuals, will be able
to cover their needs as well. Id. at 765–66 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
230
Id. at 746 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
231
E.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, One Cheer for Hobby Lobby: Improbable Alternatives,
Truly Strict Scrutiny, and Third-Party Employee Burdens, 38 HARV. J.L. & GEN. 153,
175–76 (2015); Mark Tushnet, Accommodation of Religion Thirty Years On, 38 HARV. J. L.
& GEN. 1, 29–30 (2015). But see Elizabeth Sepper, Gendering Corporate Conscience, 38
HARV. J.L. & GEN. 193, 206–08 (2015) (claiming that the Court largely sidestepped the issue
of third-party burdens but disapproved their relevance in future RFRA cases).
232
Wheaton College v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 958, 958–59 (2014).
233
Id. at 960.
234
Id. at 958–59.
235
Id. at 960 (internal quotation omitted).
236
Id. at 958–59.
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decided to remand the case to the lower courts, vaguely instructing them to “arrive
at an approach going forward that accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise
while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans
‘receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.’”237 Thus,
while in these three cases the Court has shown much concern for the religious liberty
claims of for-profit and non-profit organizations, it seems to have been much less
concerned with the necessity of ensuring that their employees will actually receive
the “seamless contraceptive coverage” that they were entitled to receive.238
Under the Court’s instruction in Zubik that directed the administration to
formulate rules for contraceptive coverage that accommodate religious exercise, and
in light of the Court’s refusal to confront head-on the question whether it is plausible
for employers to claim that the mere notification of refusal to pay contraceptive
coverage can be considered a substantial burden on religion, the Trump administration formulated rules that expanded exemptions for both religious and non-religious
employers dramatically.239 The Administration issued interim rules, which it later
finalized, that significantly broadened the definition of exempt religious employers
to encompass any employer that objects to contraceptive coverage on the basis of
sincerely held religious beliefs, including for-profit and publicly traded entities.240
The exemption means that these employers do not even need to participate in the
self-certification process that can ensure their employees receive coverage through
government plans unless they voluntarily choose to do so.241 Moreover, similar rules
were created to offer a “moral exemption” for non-profit employers, for-profit
employers with no publicly traded components, and employers with sincerely held
moral objections to providing some or all forms of contraceptive coverage.242 The
Supreme Court affirmed these rules in the Little Sisters of the Poor case, holding
that providing women employees with contraceptive coverage is not a compelling
state interest, and that requiring employers to take part in a self-certification process
that would enable the government to ensure alternative contraceptive coverage for
their women employees constitutes a substantial burden on the employer’s religious
237

Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S. 403, 408 (2016) (per curiam).
Id. at 410. While Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg in their concurrence, which emphasized the duty towards the women employees, used the word “seamless” to describe the required
coverage, this word was missing from the Court’s opinion.
239
Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367,
2377 (2020).
240
The interim rules and then the final rules were challenged in various courts and the
Third Circuit has issued a preliminary nationwide injunction against their enforcement.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; State of New Jersey v. President of the United States of
America, Docket Nos. 17-3752, 18-1253, 19-1129, 19-1189 (3d Cir. 2019).
241
45 C.F.R. § 147.132 (religious exemptions in connection with coverage of certain
preventive health services).
242
45 C.F.R. § 147.133 (moral exemptions in connection with coverage of certain
preventive health services).
238
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exercise.243 In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg noted that under the Court’s judgement,
“between 70,500 and 126,400 women would immediately lose access to no-cost
contraceptive services” and that such a result violates the principle that government
cannot accommodate religion beyond Free Exercise Clause requirements “at the
expense of the rights of third parties.”244
It is possible to view the result in Little Sisters of the Poor as a sudden deviation
from the respect the Court has shown in Hobby Lobby and other contraceptive
coverage cases to the principle of preventing third-party harm.245 However, in my
view, the respect shown by the majority of the Court to the reproductive rights of
women in these cases has from the beginning been merely theoretical and conditional, and the Court did not show any interest in protecting these rights in either of
these cases. While in Hobby Lobby the Court simply assumed that women’s reproductive rights are protected, and in Wheaton College and Zubik it gave a vague order
to the administration to try to protect them, in Little Sisters of the Poor the Court
chose to acknowledge that, in its view, protecting women’s reproductive rights was
not a compelling state interest and that therefore restricting them to protect religious
freedom was not only allowed but actually required by the RFRA.246 By interpreting
the RFRA so broadly as to allow (or even require) the government to restrict the
rights of others for the sake of religious interests that are not mandated by the Free
Exercise Clause, the Court has condoned a violation of the Establishment Clause
and has given unwarranted preference to religious citizens.247
IV. RELIGION, LAW, AND POLITICS AND THEIR IMPACT ON
WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN ISRAEL
A. Religion, Law, and Politics in Israel
Israel is generally considered a Western liberal democracy, although it is an
outlier among Western democracies in its religion-state relations.248 Yet, as discussed
above, recent changes in the place and importance of religion in the United States,
as well as in other Western liberal countries, have made the Israeli situation more
pertinent to such democracies.249 The increasing desecularization of the world and
243

Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2394–96.
Id. at 2401.
245
See, e.g., Affordable Care Act—Contraceptive Mandate—Religious Exemptions—Little
Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 134 HARV. L. REV. 560, 560
(2020).
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Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. at 2396.
247
Gedicks, supra note 231, at 172.
248
Steven Menashi, Ethnonationalism and Liberal Democracy, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 57,
67 (2010).
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For typologies of religion state relations, see Gila Stopler, Religion-State Relations and
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concurrent increasing demands for what José Casanova calls the deprivatization of
religion have raised many questions regarding the proper place of religion within the
state and its constitutional order.250 Casanova describes the deprivatization of religion
as “the fact that religious traditions throughout the world are refusing to accept the
marginal and privatized role which theories of modernity as well as theories of
secularization had reserved for them.”251 In Israel, religion has been partly institutionalized in some areas of law from the outset, while being kept in the private
sphere and separated from the state in all others.252 However, in recent years, Jewish
religious conservatives vying for a larger role for religion in the public sphere in
Israel have initiated a wide-ranging and carefully orchestrated political struggle to
restrict the presence of women in the public sphere for religious reasons.253 Consequently, Israel is currently undergoing a highly contentious political struggle between
religious conservatives and feminists over women’s right to an unobstructed presence
in the public sphere, which resembles in many respects the struggle in the United States
between Christian nationalists and feminists over women’s reproductive rights.254
Whereas most liberal democratic states do not define themselves in reference
to their ethnic or religious character, Israel is defined in its Basic Laws as a Jewish
and Democratic state.255 This definition is relatively new and was adopted along
with the two Basic Laws on human rights—Basic Law: Human Dignity & Liberty
and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.256 However, the origins of this definition
can be traced to the Israeli Declaration of Establishment.257 This declaration states
that Israel is to be a “Jewish state,” but at the same time that it will “ensure complete
equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion,
Their Effects on Human Rights: Nationalization, Authorization, and Privatization, 6 OXFORD
J.L. & RELIGION 476–79 (2017) [hereinafter Religion-State Relations and Their Effects on
Human Rights]. See generally MONSMA & SOPER, supra note 161.
250
JOSÉ CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD 5 (1994).
251
Id.
252
See Stopler, Constitutionalism and Religion, supra note 5, at 219–20.
253
Id. See generally Tirosh, supra note 5.
254
See supra Section III.B; Tirosh, supra note 5, at 842.
255
Stopler, Constitutionalism and Religion, supra note 5, at 208.
256
Basic Law: Human Dignity & Liberty, 5752-1992, SH 1391 60, 60 as amended (Isr.),
https://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfa-archive/1992/pages/basic%20law-%20human%20dig
nity%20and%20liberty-.aspx#:~:text=The%20purpose%20of%20this%20Basic,a%20Jewish
%20and%20democratic%20state.&text=2.,of%20any%20person%20as%20such.&text=T
here%20shall%20be%20no%20violation%20of%20the%20property%20of%20a%20person
[https://perma.cc/BF8P-63EW]. See also Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 5754-1994,
SH 1454 90, 90 (Isr.), https://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfa-archive/1994/pages/basic%20law-%
20freedom%20of%20occupation-.aspx [https://perma.cc/G5BF-EXW8].
257
The Declaration of Establishment of the State of Israel (Israel, May 14, 1948), https://
www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20establishment
%20of%20state%20of%20israel.aspx#:~:text=On%20May%2014%2C%201948%2C%20on,
of%20the%20State%20of%20Israel [https://perma.cc/8WWW-JBYV].
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race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education
and culture.”258
There is an ongoing and yet unsettled debate in Israel with regard to the exact
meaning of its definition as a Jewish state.259 While some claim that this definition
establishes the Jewish religion in the state and justifies the granting of legal authority and status to the Jewish religion, others dispute this reading of the Basic Laws,
arguing that the definition “Jewish state” should be understood merely as designating the character of Israel as the home of the Jewish people, where Jews realize their
right to national self-determination, and not as an establishment of the Jewish religion in the state.260
Regardless of this debate, and long before the enactment of the Basic Laws, the
Jewish religion in its Orthodox version has been partially established in the state
through laws granting legal status to Orthodox Jewish religious authorities in several
areas, the most important of which being that of personal laws.261 All Jews in Israel
are subject to Orthodox Jewish religious personal laws.262 At the same time, members
of other recognized religious communities such as Muslims and various Christian
denominations are also subject to the personal religious laws of their respective
religions.263 This state of affairs has been established during the period of the
258

Id.
See, e.g., Avigdor Levontin, “Jewish and Democratic”—Personal Reflections, in THE
STATE OF ISRAEL: BETWEEN JUDAISM AND DEMOCRACY at 322, 328 (Yossi David ed., 2000);
Menahem Alon, Constitution by Legislation: The Values of a Jewish and Democratic State
in Light of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Personal Freedom, 17 IUNEI MISHPAT 659 (1993).
260
See Levontin, supra note 259, at 322, 328 (taking a position against interpreting the term
“Jewish” in the Basic Laws as including the Jewish religion); Alon, supra note 259, at 668–70
(taking a position supporting the inclusion of the Jewish religion in the term “Jewish”).
261
Orthodox Judaism in Israel contains two separate streams—the Orthodox stream (often
referred to as the Religious Zionist stream) and the ultra-Orthodox stream. These two streams
share control over the Jewish religious establishment in Israel. See generally Israel’s Religiously Divided Society, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.pewforum.org/2016
/03/08/israels-religiously-divided-society/ [https://perma.cc/5QCL-XN8M].
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RUTH HALPERIN-KADDARI, WOMEN IN ISRAEL: A STATE OF THEIR OWN 233–34 (Penn
Press 2004).
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The authority of the various religious communities was established through legislation
from the period of the British Mandate that was later incorporated into Israeli law. See The
Palestine Order in Council, 1922, ¶ 51, Aug. 10, 1922, League of Nations (Palestine). The authority of the Muslim religious courts can still be found in Sign 52 of the Palestine Order in
Council, 1922, and that of the various Christian denominations in Sign 54 of the Order. Id. at
¶¶ 52, 54. The authority of the Jewish Rabbinical Courts is set out in the Jurisdiction of Rabbinical Courts (Marriage and Divorce) Act, 1953. Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage
and Divorce) Law, 5713-1953, LSI 134 139 (1952–1953) (Isr.), https://knesset.gov.il/review
/data/eng/law/kns2_rabbiniccourts_eng.pdf. The authority of the Druze religious courts can
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Ottoman rule over the Eretz-Israel/Palestine region and has been maintained by the
British mandate and later by the state of Israel.264 The imposition of the religious
personal laws of the various religious communities on all residents, and the lack of
an alternative civil marriage, constitute a violation of the right to freedom of conscience and belief, as well as a violation of the rights of women who are subject to
the discriminatory patriarchal religious laws of the various religious communities.265
However, it should be noted that each person has the legal right to change her
religious affiliation and exit her religious community, thereby avoiding being
subjected to the community’s religious personal law.266 Other ways of avoiding the
application of religious personal laws are marrying abroad or living as common law
spouses, a status which is particularly broad in Israel and has been legally recognized
through both legislation and judicial decisions to enable people to live as spouses
without having to partake in a religious marriage.267 That the state-sanctioned violation of rights occurs within each religious group and group members can partly
ameliorate it by exiting the group makes the Israeli case pertinent to the American
case since the American model of separation between religion and the state with the
extensive autonomy it grants to religious institutions similarly results in state-sanctioned
discrimination against women within their own religious communities.268 In both
cases, the right of exit cannot be considered an adequate remedy, and the discrimination translates into women’s subordinate status in society.269
The centerpieces of the liberal facets of Israel’s constitutional system are Basic
Law: Human Dignity & Liberty and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, which afford
constitutional protection to several fundamental rights.270 These basic laws on human
rights do not explicitly protect the right to freedom of religion and conscience, or the
right to equality or to free speech.271 However, the Israeli Supreme Court has ruled
GIDEON SAPIR & DANIEL STATMAN, STATE AND RELIGION IN ISRAEL: A PHILOSOPHICALLEGAL INQUIRY 167–85 (Cambridge University Press, 2019).
264
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See, e.g., Frances Raday, On Equality—Judicial Profiles, 35 ISR. L. REV., 380, 390–91
(1995).
266
Religious Community Ordinance (Conversion) [last modified 6/14/47].
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See SAPIR & STATMAN, supra note 263, at 177–85.
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See Tirosh, supra note 5, at 828–30; WHITEHEAD & PERRY, TAKING AMERICA BACK
FOR GOD, supra note 28, at 151.
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Free Exercise of Discrimination, supra note 24, at 517–23.
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Basic Law: Human Dignity & Liberty, 5752-1992, SH 1391 60, 60 as amended (Isr.),
https://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfa-archive/1992/pages/basic%20law-%20human%20dignity
%20and%20liberty-.aspx#:~:text=The%20purpose%20of%20this%20Basic,a%20Jewish%20
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that all these rights are protected by Basic Law: Human Dignity & Liberty, insomuch
as they are all an essential part of the right to dignity, which is expressly enshrined
in the Basic Law.272 In most contexts, the Supreme Court has given these rights, as
well as other rights enshrined in the Basic Laws, a liberal interpretation based on the
commitment of the Israeli legal system to individual liberty and to substantive equality.273 A similar liberal commitment is also evident in various human rights laws
such as the Equal Employment Opportunities Law, the Prohibition of Discrimination
in Products, Services, and Entry into Places of Entertainment and Public Places
Law, the Freedom of Information Law and the Male and Female Workers Equal Pay
Law, which even includes a comparable worth component.274 Another central piece
of liberal legislation is the Israeli Women’s Equal Rights Law, which due to its
importance was termed by the Israeli Supreme Court “a regal law” whose intent of ensuring equality for women should, according to the Court, inform any legal action.275
The legal framework determining religion-state relations in Israel is not enshrined in any of its basic laws; rather it was determined by regular legislation
enacted prior to them. Because the Basic Laws have constitutional status, regular
legislation is generally subject to the Basic Laws.276 However, Basic Law: Human
Dignity & Liberty contains a provision stating that its enactment shall not affect the
validity of any laws enacted prior to it.277 The result is that although the Supreme
Court has interpreted Basic Law: Human Dignity & Liberty as affording constitutional status to fundamental rights such as equality, freedom of religion, and freedom
of speech, this status cannot be used to challenge the validity of the pre-existing
legislation that gives state power to religion, regardless of the violation of basic
272

Gideon Sapir, Daphne Barak-Erez & Aharon Barak, Introduction: Israeli Constitutional
Law at the Crossroads, in ISRAELI CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE MAKING 1, 2–3 (Gideon Sapir,
Daphne Barak-Erez, Aharon Barak eds., Hart 2013).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE MAKING 173 (Gideon Sapir, Daphne Barak-Erez, Aharon Barak
eds., Hart 2013).
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20person [https://perma.cc/2FAN-S7A8].
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rights that it entails.278 The most important pre-existing laws affecting women’s
rights are those that subject all matters of marriage and divorce in Israel to the
religious courts of the various religious communities, which are staffed by religious
judges who adjudicate cases according to the community’s religious law.279 The largest
and most powerful courts are the Jewish religious courts, the Rabbinical Courts,
which are mostly staffed by ultra-orthodox judges whose interpretation of Jewish
religious law is most conservative and highly discriminatory towards women.280
While the Israeli Women’s Equal Rights Law declares a general commitment
to women’s full equality in all legal matters, it allows specific exceptions in matters
pertaining to the substantive application of the religious laws of marriage and
divorce, and to the appointment of religious judges.281 Over the years, the Israeli
Supreme Court has interpreted these exemptions narrowly to expand the protection
of women’s rights.282 For example, in the Doe case the Court held that the appointment of a female arbitrator on behalf of the woman in proceedings before a Sharia
Court pertains neither to the substantive application of the religious laws of marriage
and divorce, nor to the appointment of religious judges, and is therefore subject to
the equality mandate and must be allowed by the Court.283 This case is an example
of the Israeli Supreme Court’s willingness to restrict religious law’s adverse impact
on women’s right to equality in order to advance liberal egalitarian constitutional
principles, wherever this is possible. Unlike religious bodies in most liberal states,
which are private and therefore largely immune to egalitarian constitutional norms,284
278

Id.
The authority of the various religious communities was established through legislation
from the period of the British Mandate that was later incorporated into Israeli law. See Palestine
Order in Council, Aug. 10, 1922, ¶ 51 (Palestine). The authority of the Muslim religious courts
can still be found in Sign 52 of the Order, and that of the various Christian denominations
in Sign 54 of the Order. Id. at ¶¶ 52, 54. The authority of the Jewish Rabbinical Courts is set
out in the Jurisdiction of Rabbinical Courts (Marriage and Divorce) Act, 1953. Rabbinical
Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 5713-1953, 7 LSI 139 (1952–1953) (Isr.).
The authority of the Druze religious courts can be found in the Druze Religious Courts Law,
1962. Druze Religious Courts Law, 5723-1962, 8 LSI 27 (1962–1963) (Isr.).
280
Stopler, Religion-State Relations and Their Effects on Human Rights, supra note 249,
at 484–86.
281
§§ 5, 7(3) Women’s Equal Rights Law 5711-1951 SH 82 248 (Isr.), https://www
.knesset.gov.il/review/data/eng/law/kns1_women_eng.pdf. These exceptions are designed
to align the scope of the equality legislation with the authority of the religious courts.
282
See, e.g., HCJ 3856/11 Doe v. Supreme Sharia Court of Appeals (2013) (Isr.). Translation by Versa: Opinion of the Supreme Court of Israel, http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions
/doe-v-supreme-sharia-court-appeals [https://perma.cc/NG2T-SWHX].
283
In a different case concerning Jewish religious courts, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled
in favor of petitioners who claimed that women should be trained and appointed as rabbinical
pleaders on behalf of litigants in the rabbinical courts, on similar grounds. HCJ 6300/93
Institute for the Training of Claims Court v. The Minister of Religious Affairs, 48(4) IsrSC
441 (1994).
284
See discussion of the ministerial exception supra Section III.A.
279
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most religious courts in Israel operate as state organs and are therefore subject to
constitutional supervision wherever prescribed by law.285 As the Supreme Court
explained in Doe with respect to religious state organs:
. . . this is a field in which discrimination against women at the
declarative and principle level, too, still remains. This is partly
protected by legislation, and the Court must maneuver its way in
a manner that respects the legislator’s decisions, but with maximum commitment to the basic principle and constitutional right
of equality for women. This is particularly true when at hand are
public and state institutions whose services are required by the
entire public who cannot avoid such institutions’ services. The
perspective regarding discrimination against women shall be
different for a member of a community that chooses to belong to
it and to accept its rules and the rulings of its institutions, than
for a public institution which the public cannot choose whether
or not to need its services.286
As briefly described above, Israeli Law sets forth a complex arrangement that is
intended to strike a balance between a narrowly defined area of institutionalized religious control over aspects of family law and other areas of law covered by secular
liberal legislation. While this balance has always been detrimental to women in terms
of family law, it has provided them an extensive and progressive protection of rights
in most other areas.287 However, in recent years, religious conservatives, who have
always been disproportionately politically powerful, have gained enough political
power to initiate changes in public policy that allow the segregation and exclusion
of women from some parts of the public sphere in Israel for religious reasons.288
The two most significant religious conservative groups working for this change are
the Jewish ultra-orthodox (UO) community, for whom the segregation was initiated
in the first place, and the more conservative sections of the Jewish Religious Zionist
(RZ) community, who are demanding its further expansion to suit their own
needs.289 Together, these two groups comprise eighteen percent of the population in
Israel, or twenty-two percent of its Jewish population.290 While both communities
285

See HCJ 3856/11 Doe v. Supreme Sharia Court of Appeals (2013) (Isr.). Translation
by Versa: Opinion of the Supreme Court of Israel, http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/doe-v
-supreme-sharia-court-appeals [https://perma.cc/B63M-Z6LA].
286
Id.
287
See supra Section IV.A (discussing religion and women’s rights in Israel).
288
See supra Section IV.B (discussing women in the public sphere in Israel).
289
Stopler, Constitutionalism and Religion, supra note 5, at 211.
290
Israel’s Religiously Divided Society, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.pew
forum.org/2016/03/08/israels-religiously-divided-society/ [https://perma.cc/SCU2-BLYS].
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belong to the Orthodox stream of Judaism, they differ in important respects. “The
RZ community is well integrated into Israeli society in terms of places of residence,
of work and of army service, and its subgroups are varied in their interpretations of
Orthodox Jewish religion.”291 Nevertheless, “it would be accurate to say that most
of the RZ community lean towards the more conservative side of the spectrum of
orthodox Judaism, and an increasingly influential minority among them espouse the
UO’s ultra conservative religious views and practices.”292
The ultra-orthodox Jewish community in Israel is a highly religious community
that comprises nine percent of the population and abides by strict modesty standards
that often include the segregation between men and women in many settings.293
Although the UO are a distinct and very religious community, they are divided into
diverse subgroups along the axes of types of religiosity, ethnicity, and social status.294
While the UO community is a minority numerically and most of its members keep
themselves apart from the rest of society both geographically and culturally, the UO
are nevertheless a politically powerful community whose political leaders are highly
influential.295 The community’s political power well exceeds their size due to their
leaders’ ability to play the tie breaker on important political questions, and due to
their almost constant presence in key positions in the Israeli government.296 Another
reason for the UO’s political power is the fact that the UO (together with the RZ)
control the extensive Jewish religious establishment in Israel.297 The Jewish religious
state institutions in Israel are state organs with sizable budgets that, among other
things, hold coercive state power over all Jews in Israel in matters of marriage and
divorce, as previously discussed.298 The UO’s religious way of life includes intensive religious studies for most of the men and intensive child bearing for the women,
making the UO community the poorest community in Israel and leaving it highly
Ultra-orthodox comprise nine percent of Jews, religious Zionists thirteen percent, Masorti
Jews (traditional) comprise twenty-nine percent of Jews, and secular Jews comprise fortynine percent of all Jews. Id.
291
Stopler, Constitutionalism and Religion, supra note 5, at 211.
292
Id.
293
Id.
294
Lee Cahaner, Opinion, The Ultra-Orthodox Community on the Conservatism-Modernism
Spectrum, ISR. DEMOCRACY INST. (May 31, 2019), https://en.idi.org.il/articles/26911 [https://
perma.cc/UXV5-3ZM3].
295
Stopler, Constitutionalism and Religion, supra note 5, at 211.
296
Id.
297
Nissan Slominslki, Opinion, The Appointment of Rabbinical Court Judges—An UltraOrthodox State or a Zionist State?, TORAVODA (Oct. 2007), http://www.toravoda.org.il/node
/584; Uri Polak, For the First Time in a Decade: A Religious Zionist Judge in the Great Rabbinical Court, KIPA (Mar. 25, 2012), http://www.kipa.co.il/now/47971.html [https://perma.cc
/X3N4-JVN5].
298
The Chief Rabbinate of Israel Law, 5740-1980, SH 965 90 (Isr.); The Jewish Religious
Services Law, 5731-1971, SH 628 130 (Isr.).
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dependent on state funds and on its leaders who secure these funds through political
maneuvering.299 UO Yeshiva students are exempt from military service and this fact
creates tensions between the UO and other sections of the Israeli Jewish population
as well as legal complications.300 The exemption of UO Yeshiva students from
military service has become a politically charged issue and has even brought about
the dissolution of the Israeli parliament (Knesset) on several occasions.301
The majority of the UO, as well as the majority of the RZ, should be considered
“traditionalists” in Stoeckl’s sense discussed above.302 Indeed, the political leadership of these two communities operates in ways that are strikingly similar to those
of traditionalists in the Catholic Church and in the Russian Orthodox Christian
community discussed by Stoeckl.303 Just like Christian traditionalists, the UO and
RZ make extensive strategic use of secular arguments in public discourse to achieve
their goals. They use liberal concepts such as freedom of religion and conscience,
pluralism, equality, and multiculturalism to justify their own demands for religious
accommodations while at the same time remaining closed to any possibility of
change in their own positions.304 The manifestly strategic use the UO and RZ make
of these liberal concepts is evidenced by the fact that these two communities jointly
control the Jewish religious establishment, which is a theocratic state institution
whose coercive powers are imposed on Jews in Israel. The leaders of both communities adamantly object to any curtailment in the power of the Jewish religious establishment and work diligently to expand it.305 As we will see, the same strategic use
299

See generally Gila Stopler, The Right to an Exclusively Religious Education—The
Ultra-Orthodox Community in Israel in Comparative Perspective, 42 GA. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 749 (2014) [hereinafter The Right to an Exclusively Religious Education].
300
Yedida Stern, A Blow to the IDF as the People’s Army, ISR. DEMOCRACY INST. (Feb. 26,
2020), https://en.idi.org.il/articles/30881 [https://perma.cc/FR8T-QUEF].
301
Id.
302
See supra notes 150–54 and accompanying text. As explained earlier, Stoeckl defines
traditionalists as being neither religious liberals nor religious fundamentalists. They share
with religious fundamentalists their rejection of egalitarian individualism and universalism.
However, unlike fundamentalists they do not retreat from society and they reject violent means
of reversal. Instead, they use their significant political power and the conservative political
and religious establishment strategically in order to implement their illiberal ideology. Stoeckl,
supra note 131, at 35–38.
303
See supra notes 149–52 and accompanying text.
304
The most important socially and religiously conservative think tank in Israel, Kohelet,
is funded by American conservatives (the American Tikvah fund) and promotes an Americanstyle conservative agenda. Rafi Reznik, The Rise of American Conservatism in Israel, 8 PA.
ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 383, 452–53 (2020). Kohelet is involved in key cases concerning the
segregation and exclusion of women that will be discussed below, and promotes the idea that
such segregation should be allowed not only for UO, but also to RZ’s and others who desire it.
305
Gila Stopler, Political Liberalism in a Jewish and Democratic State, in STRENGTHENING
HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS IN GENEVA, ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND BEYOND 218
(Joseph David et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2018) (forthcoming 2021).
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of liberal concepts to expand the power of religion in the public sphere and curtail
the rights of women is evident in their demand for the segregation of women in the
public sphere for religious reasons.306
B. The Exclusion and Segregation of Women in the Public Sphere in Israel
In recent years Israeli authorities have initiated the exclusion and segregation
of women in various public spaces and services, presumably to facilitate the integration of the UO community into the economy and general society, and encourage its
members to serve in the army, obtain higher education, and integrate in the job
market.307 The reasoning offered for the initiated exclusion and segregation of women
is to facilitate UO integration through the replication of the strict standards of sexual
modesty practiced by the UO within their private sphere into the common public
sphere.308 Supposedly, such replication will allow UO members to integrate without
abandoning their way of life and their customary practices.309
When referring to women’s exclusion and segregation (hadarat nashim) I am
referring to “rules and practices that constrain women’s actions, movement, voice,
or appearance due to their sex” in the public sphere.310 The exclusion and segregation of women in the public sphere is achieved by denying them some services
entirely (exclusion),311 by forbidding their presence in various places at the same
time as men (segregation),312 or by allowing their presence only as long as they dress
and behave “modestly”.313 Such rules and practices
306

See Stopler, The Right to an Exclusively Religious Education, supra note 299, at 789, 793.
See Yofi Tirosh, Opinion, Israel’s Access for ultra-Orthodox Men Excludes Women,
HAARETZ (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-israels-access-for-ul
tra-orthodox-men-excludes-women-1.5627035 [https://perma.cc/DD8H-4W4Z]; TOI Staff, High
Court okays gender-segregated ultra-Orthodox college programs, ISR. TIMES (July 13, 2021,
12:44 AM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/high-court-okays-gender-segregated-ultra-ortho
dox-college-programs/ [https://perma.cc/9Y8L-P7HL].
308
Id.
309
Stopler, Constitutionalism and Religion, supra note 5, at 219–20.
310
Tirosh, supra note 5, at 824.
311
For example, segregation occurs when a municipality initiates a music performance
and restricts participation to only men. Examples can be found in MIRIAM ZALKIND, THE
ISRAEL WOMEN’S NETWORK, WOMEN’S EXCLUSION IN ISRAEL—A DECADE OF STRUGGLE
8–9 (2020) (Heb.) [hereinafter WOMEN’S EXCLUSION IN ISRAEL—A DECADE OF STRUGGLE],
https://iwn.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/wonems-right-booklet-FINAL-2020.pdf.
312
For example, when women are sent to the back of the bus, when they are instructed to
walk only on one side of the sidewalk or to enter medical clinics or public events only from
a designated entrance and restrict themselves to certain parts of the building. Id. at 9–10.
313
For example, when bus drivers refuse to allow women to board a bus because they are
not dressed modestly or when women are barred from entering certain shops or even certain
neighborhoods for this reason. Id. at 10–11.
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Openly and categorically deny women equal participation in the
public sphere based on a view that as females, they are fundamentally different . . . [and] hinder women’s enjoyment of primary
goods such as dignity, voice, personal autonomy, freedom of
speech, freedom of occupation, political, cultural, and social voice,
and other conditions that foster an individual and group-based
sense of self-respect and the conditions for human flourishing.314
It is important to note that while all agree that sexual modesty standards in Judaism
have religious origins, the specific religious source for these standards and their precise content are highly varied and contested. Consequently, many contested justifications have been offered for the gender segregation initiated by the state, including
respect for religious freedom, freedom of conscience, respect for religious feelings,
multicultural accommodation, and the right of the UO to equality.315
While the sex segregation was presumably intended to affect only members of
the UO community, it has inevitably had a significant effect on all users of the public
sphere in Israel, leading to the exclusion of all women from increasingly larger segments of the public sphere and consequently to restrictions on their rights and on
their equal opportunities.316 This has generated heated opposition from feminists who
have initiated a struggle against the gender exclusion and segregation in the public
sphere working through the courts, in government and in the legislature.317
Consequently, some of the state-sponsored segregation practices have been
thwarted. Thus, for example, segregation in parts of the public transportation system
where women were sent to sit in the back while men were seated in the front was struck
down by the Supreme Court in 2011 as discriminatory towards women.318 Another
relative success for the feminist struggle was a 2014 government resolution adopting
a report by the Ministry of Justice which prohibited the segregation of women in
certain public services and spaces.319 However, other forms of segregation, such as
314

Tirosh, supra note 5, at 824.
Stopler, Constitutionalism and Religion, supra note 5, at 219–20.
316
Id. at 219.
317
WOMEN’S EXCLUSION IN ISRAEL—A DECADE OF STRUGGLE, supra note 311, at 12–15
(detailing significant milestones in the litigation against women’s exclusion from 2010–2020);
Tirosh, supra note 5, at 829–30, 832–33, 843–46 (analyzing the legislation and litigation relating to women’s exclusion in Israel); see also Stopler, The Free Exercise of Discrimination,
supra note 24, at 492–95 (discussing the early history of gender segregation in Israel).
318
HCJ 746/07 Ragen v. Ministry of Transport 64(2) PD 530 (2011) (Isr.), http://elyon1.court
.gov.il/files_eng/07/460/007/t38/07007460.t38.htm. An unofficial English translation of the
Judgment is available on VERSA, Ragen v. Ministry of Transport, https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu
/opinions/ragen-v-ministry-transport [https://perma.cc/CT79-5QP4] (last visited Mar. 28, 2022).
319
MINISTRY OF JUST., REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENTAL TEAM EXAMINING THE PHENOMENON OF THE EXCLUSION OF WOMEN IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE (2013) (Heb.), http://www.justice
.gov.il/Pubilcations/Articles/Documents/DochHadaratNasim.pdf. On March 30, 2014, this
315
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segregation in various public events, still prevail and have even spread, and the
debate over their legality and legitimacy has intensified.320 Another form of gender
segregation that has continued to expand over time is the segregation of women in
the Israeli army.321 The army has committed itself to providing UO male recruits with
a “female-free zone” during their army service, and physically bars women soldiers
as well as women officers from being present in the vicinity of UO soldiers.322 Similarly, the Israeli Council for Higher Education has initiated segregated university
courses for UO men and women in which female professors are barred from teaching
the UO male students, while male professors are free to teach UO female students.323
C. Assessing the Justifications for the Segregation of Women in the Public Sphere
The struggle over the segregation and exclusion of women in the public sphere
in Israel is ongoing and the forms of segregation are diverse and changing. Until
recently, the major segregation cases before the Israeli Supreme Court were the
cases initiated against the Israeli Council for Higher Education (ICHE) regarding
segregation in academia, filed in 2016 and 2017; their slow adjudication, as well as
the Court’s obscure final judgement, given more than four years after the commencement of the cases signal the Court’s reluctance to rule on the matter.324 The
reluctance of the Court to rule on this specific matter reflects a larger unwillingness
of the Court to give substantive constitutional rulings on cases pertaining to the
exclusion and segregation of women in the public sphere.325 According to a study
report was adopted by the government as Resolution No. 1526 of the Thirty-Third Government of Israel.
320
Michal Gera Margaliot & Miriam Zalkind, Feminism in Israel Contesting Social
Exclusion in Israel, FATHOM (Feb. 2018), https://fathomjournal.org/feminism-in-israel-con
testing-social-exclusion-in-israel/ [https://perma.cc/34X8-YPJS]; WOMEN’S EXCLUSION IN
ISRAEL—A DECADE OF STRUGGLE, supra note 311, at 20–22.
321
See Margaliot & Zalkind, supra note 320.
322
Stopler, Constitutionalism and Religion, supra note 5, at 219–20. See also, e.g., Yefet,
supra note 85, at 258–59; Dr. Idit Shafran Gittleman, Women in the IDF: The Challenge of
an ‘Integrated’ Army, ISR. DEMOCRACY INST. (Feb. 28, 2018), https://en.idi.org.il/articles
/20967 [https://perma.cc/L55A-9JYD].
323
Or Kashti & Netael Bandel, Israel’s Top Court Allows Sex-Segregated University
Classes to Integrate Haredim, HAARETZ (July 13, 2021), https://www.haaretz.com/israel
-news/.premium-israel-s-top-court-allows-sex-segregated-at-university-classes-to-integrate
-haredim-1.9994427 [https://perma.cc/R8KG-SMSH].
324
HCJ 8010/16 Berzon v. Council for Higher Education; HCJ 6500/17 Dr. Yofi Tirosh
v. Council for Higher Education; 8683/17 Kohelet Policyy Forum v. Council for Higher
Education (2021) (Isr.), https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=Hebrew
Verdicts\16\100\080\k61&fileName=16080100.K61&type=4 [https://perma.cc/2UQQ-5YUR].
For the petition to the Supreme Court against the Council for Higher Education’s policy, see
Pet’rs’ Req., Dec. 7, 2017, https://law.acri.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/bagatz-6500
-17-gender-segregation-amicus.pdf.
325
Tirosh, supra note 5, at 839.
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by Tirosh “[i]n the past decade, the HCJ has consistently refrained from developing
constitutional doctrine on women’s exclusion. Instead, it has favored ad-hoc procedural
solutions to mitigate the concrete cases of discriminatory exclusion brought before
it.”326 Tirosh argues that this reluctance by the Court has resulted in a deepening of
the segregation and exclusion of women.327 Tirosh posits that the Court’s reluctance
to issue substantive rulings in these kinds of cases may be due to the justices’
underestimation of the threat posed to women’s rights by the expanding segregation
and exclusion of women; such reluctance by the Court may also be a result of the
Israeli Supreme Court’s recent practice to refrain from ruling on publicly sensitive
human rights petitions that may draw criticism against the Court for being too
activist or culturally insensitive.328
While both reasons given by Tirosh are plausible, I would argue that the political
power exhibited by the UO and RZ is an additional central consideration influencing
the Court to try and resolve the issue of women’s segregation and exclusion without
making any substantive rulings. Still, it is important to note that neither of the
weighty considerations detailed above stopped the Court from making substantive
repeated rulings annulling laws exempting Yeshiva students from military service,
despite the very high stakes involved in them.329 The different treatment of the two
issues is in line with this Article’s claim that the patriarchal nature of liberal society
can explain—at least in part—the failure by the Court to understand the magnitude
of the issue of women’s segregation and exclusion. This failure is also evident in the
Court’s obscure final judgement and verdict in the cases concerning the segregation
in the academia. While in their respective decisions all justices gave lip service to
the importance of women’s equality and the potentially disastrous effects of a policy
of segregation based on the notion of “separate but equal”, the majority of the Court
rejected the petitions.330 It held that the Israeli Council for Higher Education (ICHE)
was authorized to initiate the segregation and that it was not persuaded by the substantial evidence brought by petitioners that the segregation was indeed discriminatory.
In a move similar to that of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Hobby Lobby line of
cases, the Israeli Supreme Court chose to ignore the inevitably discriminatory effects
326

Id. at 823.
Id. at 839.
328
Id. at 841.
329
HCJ 1877/14 Movement for Quality of Government in Israel v. The Knesset (2017) (Isr.).
330
See pg. 129–130 to Court’s verdict, https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Down
load?path=HebrewVerdicts\16\100\080\k61&fileName=16080100.K61&type=4 [https://
perma.cc/27AD-VWMK]. The majority was comprised of three out of the five justices on
the bench. In the only prong of the petition that was accepted the majority held that the ICHE
should stop discrimination against women professors who are prevented from lecturing to
UO male students. However, the Court refrained from ordering that women professors should
be allowed to teach all courses, thereby enabling respondents to continue the practice of
assigning women professors exclusively to elective courses which the UO students can choose
not to take.
327
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of the segregation on women and to settle for instructing the ICHE to ascertain that
it implements the segregation without violating women’s right to equality.331
In view of the above, in this section, I will raise and refute the substantive
arguments raised by the UO and other supporters of the segregation and exclusion
of women from the public sphere for religious reasons. I will argue that these practices of segregation and exclusion cannot be justified by principles of either religious freedom, freedom of conscience, equality, or multiculturalism, and that they
are discriminatory and must not be allowed.
1. Religious Liberty and Offense to Religious Feelings
One claim that the UO makes is that requiring them (men in particular) to be
present in the public sphere, such as in public events, the military, or academic
settings, under conditions in which both men and women are present in mixed
company is a violation of their right to religious freedom.332 There are two different
perspectives from which to examine this claim—the religious one and the legal one.
From the religious perspective, until recently there was a general agreement that the
strict separation between men and women in the public sphere was not required
religiously but was merely an enhancement of the observance of the Mitzvah (divine
commandment) beyond the formal demands of the Jewish law (Hidur Mitzvah).333
Nevertheless, the increasing attempts by religious conservatives to spread the
segregation throughout the public sphere and the escalating struggle against these
attempts has resulted in opinions by religious leaders stating that sex segregation in
the public sphere is in fact required by Jewish religious law and its prohibition
would force religiously observant Jews to violate their religion.334 This development
331

For my argument regarding a similar move in the Hobby Lobby line of cases, see notes
245–47 and accompanying text. Also, similarly to the Hobby Lobby line of cases, the two
justices in the minority emphasized that the majority of the Court chose to ignore both the
patent lack of legal authorization for the ICHE to initiate gender segregation and the violation
of women’s rights that resulted from the segregation. See Francis Raday, Opinion, Ruling on
Gender Segregation in Colleges Is a Mistake, THE JERUSALEM POST (July 19, 2021, 8:36 PM),
https://www.jpost.com/opinion/ruling-on-gender-segregation-in-colleges-is-a-mistaken-sur
render-opinion-674352 [https://perma.cc/Z2NA-X39H].
332
E.g., Yefet, supra note 85, at 267–69 (analyzing the reasoning of religious freedom as
justification for the Israeli army’s gender segregation policies under the Appropriate Integration Regulation).
333
See, e.g., Rabbi Eliezer Melamed, Gender Segregation on Buses is Not Jewish Law,
ARUTZ SHEVA ISR. NAT’L NEWS (Dec. 30, 2011), https://www.israelnationalnews.com/Arti
cles/Article.aspx/11057 [https://perma.cc/B3EV-K372] (explaining the concept of Hidur
Mitzvah and the Jewish Halakhic stance that segregation on buses is not a religious obligation).
334
E.g., Rishon LeZion & Chief Rabbi Yitzchak Yosef, Civil Service Commissioner Please
Maintain Separation, KIKAR HASHABBAT (Nov. 14, 2018) (Heb.), https://www.kikar.co.il
/273634.html [https://perma.cc/68SC-ALP5] (detailing the letter of opinion published by the
Sefardi Chief Rabi of Israel justifying the segregation of women in a training course for entrance into Israel’s civil service for ultra-orthodox academics following a petition filed against
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is an example of the strategic use made by religious conservatives of religious
dogma in order to achieve their goal.
When deciding whether a certain restriction on a religiously motivated practice
is a violation of religious freedom, it is important to distinguish between the religious
perspective and the legal perspective. In religious liberty theory and jurisprudence
outside of the United States, there is a significant distinction between the violation
of the right to religious freedom, which is considered a violation of a fundamental
human right, and the offense to religious feelings, which, despite the potential for
a person’s feelings to be harmed, does not violate his rights.335
While a violation of religious freedom mostly occurs when a
believer is coerced into taking actions that go against her religious
beliefs, for example, coercing a religious Jew or Muslim to eat
pork, an offense to religious feelings occurs when a religious person is made aware of, or is confronted with, a practice that contradicts her religious beliefs, but is not an active participant in it.336
This important distinction relies on Mill’s harm principle.337 A person’s conduct
may only be restricted when it causes definite damage to another individual; causing
outrage to the feelings of another does not constitute such damage.338 Otherwise,
explains Mill, any majority, or any other powerful group, will be justified in enforcing its religious and moral inclinations, such as a prohibition on eating pork (in
Muslim majority countries), or a prohibition on Sunday amusements (in Christian
majority countries) on the rest of the population.339
The UO men’s claim that the mere presence of women in the public sphere
together with the men constitutes a violation of the UO men’s religious freedom
should likewise be rejected for two reasons. First, such a claim is akin to a claim by
a religious person that being exposed to someone eating pork or to people enjoying
the segregation by the Israeli Women’s Network (IWN)). Pet’r’s Req., HCJ 3515/18 IWN
v. National Lab. Ct. (2018) (Isr.), https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?
path=HebrewVerdicts%5C18%5C150%5C035%5Cr03&fileName=18035150.R03&type=4
[https://perma.cc/LME5-MRUZ].
335
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/01 Gur Aryeh v. Second Television and Radio Authority (2001) (Isr.).
336
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Religion Does Not Include Freedom from Religion, 24 L. & PHIL. 467, 475–76, 485 (2005).
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Sunday amusements is a violation of his religious freedom.340 At most, a religious
observant could claim that being exposed to people who are eating pork or enjoying
Sunday entertainment is an offense to his religious feelings. However, such an offense
cannot justify restricting other people’s right to eat pork or to partake in Sunday
entertainment. Second, and moreover, the religious conservative claim that women’s
presence in the public sphere should be prohibited because such presence violates
the conservative’s religious feelings is a deep affront to women’s human dignity and
therefore an unacceptable violation of their fundamental rights. The fact that women
are a disempowered group that is still struggling to achieve full equality and have
its members’ human dignity fully recognized in modern society makes this claim
even more unacceptable in liberal theory.341 As will be discussed in the next Part, the
expansive and unwarranted scope given by Israeli religious conservatives to religious
freedom under this interpretation is very similar to the ever-widening scope of complicity claims of religious conservatives in the United States in matters of reproductive rights. Religious conservatives use the indefinite contours of the rights to freedom
of religion and conscience to expand their reach and justify restrictions on women’s
rights which are normally strictly forbidden under antidiscrimination legislation.342
2. Freedom of Conscience
The analysis of the scope of freedom of religion carried out above is similarly
applicable to freedom of conscience.343 From the legal perspective, one could argue
for a violation of one’s freedom of conscience only in cases in which one is required
to directly perform an act that goes against his or her deeply held conscientious
beliefs, or is directly prevented from performing an act required by his or her
conscience.344 While a man may personally feel that his conscience is threatened by
the presence of women in the public sphere next to him, from the legal perspective
women’s presence in the public sphere cannot be considered a violation of the man’s
freedom of conscience. A similar point was made by U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg in her dissent in Little Sisters of the Poor when she referred
to the Court’s holding in Bowen v. Roy: “Roy signals a critical distinction in the Court’s
religious exercise jurisprudence: A religious adherent may be entitled to religious
accommodation with regard to her own conduct, but she is not entitled to ‘insist that . . .
others must conform their conduct to [her] own religious necessities.’”345 Were the
340
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law to recognize that a woman’s presence or her actions violate the conscience of the
religious man, powerful groups would be able to dictate the banishment of disempowered groups from the public sphere, allegedly to protect the former’s conscience.346
A related question, applicable for claims of both religion and conscience, is who
should bear the burden of belief? Should the believer carry the burden of the hardships that may result from his beliefs, or should that burden be placed on others?
Thus, if UO men insist that according to their beliefs they may not be present in
particular sections of the public sphere at the same time as women, who should bear
the burden of this conviction? Should women’s presence in the public sphere be
restricted in order to enable UO men to make use of these sections of the public
sphere without encountering women? Or should UO men be required to bear the
burden of their own convictions, and either avoid these sections of the public sphere
themselves when women are present, or make use of them in the presence of women
despite their religious and conscientious convictions?347
While liberal theory grants strong protection to freedom of belief, this protection
does not entail shifting the burden of belief onto others by making others bear the
costs of one’s convictions.348 According to Rawls, while the state has an obligation
to guarantee to every citizen their basic rights, liberties, and list of primary goods,
the state has no obligation to its citizens to assist in the flourishing of their respective
conceptions of the good; nor is the state required to give all reasonable comprehensive doctrines the same chance to flourish.349 Furthermore, in political liberalism,
one aspect of viewing citizens as free is that they are viewed as “capable of taking
responsibility for their ends” and “as capable of restricting their claims in matters
of justice to the kinds of things the principles of justice allow.”350 Consequently,
2410 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710
(1985)). In Bowen v. Roy, the Court ruled against a Native American father’s claim that he and
his family should be exempt from the Social Security number requirement because of their
religious beliefs that the Government’s use of his daughter’s social security number would
harm her spirit pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 695 (1986).
346
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the result in this case will be that this type of conscience-complicity claim should fail since
complicity should not trump antidiscrimination law. See Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and
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citizens cannot have any claim against the state to assist them in pursuing ends that
are incompatible with the principles of justice.351 Furthermore, according to Rawls,
assisting comprehensive doctrines that do not view persons as free and equal is
inconsistent with democratic values:
[I]f a comprehensive conception of the good is unable to endure
in a society securing the familiar equal basic liberties and mutual
toleration, there is no way to preserve it consistent with democratic values as expressed by the idea of society as a fair system
of cooperation among citizens viewed as free and equal.352
Thus, the burden of the UO conviction that men cannot be present in the public sphere
together with women should fall on the UO men. Any steps taken by the state to exclude women from the public sphere in order to accommodate UO men are not required
by freedom of conscience and belief, and are inconsistent with democratic values.353
3. Equality
Similarly, the claim that in order to promote A’s (the religious conservative) right
to equality it is necessary to banish B (woman) from the public sphere is unacceptable. According to Ronald Dworkin, the rights that an individual has against the
government are derived from the government’s duty to show equal concern and
respect for all.354 As a result, if A’s demand for the realization of his alleged right
is predicated on treating B as unequal, then by definition A’s demand cannot be
considered the realization of an individual right but at most the realization of an
interest that is not worthy of the protection of the law.355 Accordingly, the religious
conservative’s claim that women’s access to the public sphere should be restricted
in order to protect his right to equality is incoherent and groundless. This is doubly
so since the religious conservative’s demand is based on banishing a disempowered
and protected group—women—from the public sphere. A similar conclusion arises
from John Rawls’ principle of equal liberty and from his categorical admonition that
religious adherents “cannot expect others to acquiesce in an inferior liberty” in order
to accommodate the adherents’ religious beliefs.356
Ayelet Shachar expresses an analogous idea in her analysis of the conflict between
multiculturalism and equality in Canada:
351
352
353
354
355
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In those infrequent cases where diversity and equality diametrically and concretely clash, then, and where no legal considerations can mitigate the conflict, the Canadian approach concludes
that it is unjust for one person’s claim for fair inclusion to trump
another’s right to it. To put this point more schematically, it is
unjust to accept X’s claim for fair inclusion, if it leads to Y’s
unfair exclusion.357
She continues:
[I]f the Canadian experiment is to serve as a legal barometer, it
can teach us that as a matter of principle, the outer limit of respect for diversity in the spaces we share as political equals is
reached when it requires denying access to or excluding from
full participation and equal treatment to other, once-vulnerable
groups . . . .358
In the United States, this idea is expressed in the third-party harm restriction on free
exercise that was controlling precedent until the Little Sisters of the Poor case, at
least according to most commentators and Justice Ginsburg, who wrote in her dissent:
“While the Government may ‘accommodate religion beyond free exercise requirements,’. . . when it does so, it may not benefit religious adherents at the expense of
the rights of third parties.”359
Finally, a similar approach was taken by the UK employment tribunal that held
that the firing of a man due to his call to discriminate against others, motivated by
his philosophical belief in English Nationalism, cannot be considered a violation of
his right to equality.360
Accordingly, the religious conservative’s claim that women’s access to the public
sphere should be restricted in order to protect his right to equality is incoherent and
groundless. This is doubly so since the religious conservative’s demand is based on
banishing a disempowered and protected group—women—from the public sphere.361
4. Multiculturalism
Finally, a common justification Israeli state authorities give for their segregationist
policies is that these policies allegedly constitute multicultural accommodations
357
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aimed at respecting the religious modesty practices of the UO.362 Thus, these authorities and their supporters claim, liberal multicultural theory requires multicultural
accommodations (sex segregation), created in order to allow the integration of a
minority community (the UO) in the liberal state (Israel).363 However, I wish to argue
that this justification is wrong in each of its three prongs, and the aforementioned
segregationist policies cannot be justified on the basis of liberal multicultural theory.364
First, sex segregation cannot be considered a multicultural accommodation. In
his writings on multiculturalism, Kymlicka distinguishes between two types of
accommodations: internal restrictions that are placed on rights of members of the
minority community by the community itself in order to preserve its culture—to
which he objects; and external protections that limit the economic or political power
exercised by the larger society over the group, which he supports under certain
conditions.365 However, placing external restrictions on the rights of disempowered
members of the larger society in order to cater to the illiberal practices of members
of a minority community is not a type of accommodation which is even in the
purview of Kymlicka’s multicultural theory.366 Thus, restricting the access of women
in Israeli society to the public sphere on the basis of their sex in order to accommodate
UO men’s sensibilities cannot be considered a justified multicultural accommodation.367
Second, the UO community cannot be considered a minority community for the
purposes of multicultural accommodations. “While a minority community in liberal
multicultural theory is a disempowered community that needs the accommodation”
for its culture to survive, the UO community is a flourishing and “politically powerful community that controls Israel’s religious establishment and holds key positions
in the Israeli government.”368 Furthermore, liberal multicultural theory engages with
three types of minority groups that require multicultural accommodations.369 The
first are groups that seek to integrate into the existing liberal order while maintaining
personal characteristics like religious dress codes or distinct prayer times, such as
most Muslim immigrants to Europe.370 The second are isolationist groups that shun
liberal society and seek to preserve their illiberal way of life completely withdrawn
from society.371 Such groups, like the Amish in the United States, do not participate
362
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in politics and do not receive social security benefits.372 Jeff Spinner-Halev suggests
referring to such groups as partial citizens, that may be exempted from certain duties
of citizenship, as long as they are completely self-reliant and do not participate in
politics.373 Spinner-Halev contrasts the Amish with a third type of minority group,
which is also arguably isolationist—the Satmar Hasidim of Kiryas Joel in New
York.374 Unlike the Amish, explains Spinner-Halev, the Satmar Hasisdim do depend
on public funds to maintain their illiberal and isolationist way of life and use their
voting power in order to get politicians to cater to their needs.375 Consequently, he
argues, the Satmar Hasidim should not be considered partial citizens, nor should
they enjoy exemptions from the obligations of citizenship.376 There is a crucial
difference between the UO community in Israel and each of the aforementioned
minority communities. While these communities may request accommodation of
their illiberal practices but do not aim to change the liberal structure of the state
within which they reside, the UO community is set on changing the liberal democratic structure of the state in Israel by demanding the sanctioning of discriminatory
illiberal practices in the public sphere in order to make it more compatible with their
deeply conservative religious ideology.377 In this respect, the UO resemble the
politically powerful American Christian nationalists who use their political power
and their positions in the administration in order to roll back women’s rights.
“Lastly, Israel is not a strong liberal state that can accommodate illiberal practices
without endangering its liberal democratic foundations.”378 The liberal democratic
foundations of Israel are already weak due to the extensive role of the religious
establishment and the state also provides the religious establishment with extensive
autonomy, which emboldens the grasp of UO and RZ illiberal religious ideologies
on the public sphere.379 Under such conditions, any accommodation given to the UO
community serves to not only further expand illiberal ideology, but also simultaneously undermine the liberal structure of the state.380 Growing demands for sex
segregation in the public sphere and the influence of UO demands for sex segregation on subsequent, similar demands by conservative elements in the RZ community
are indicative of the injury to Israel’s liberal democratic foundations.381 Thus,
following “female-free zones” that the Israeli Army has created for UO men serving
in the military, and after political pressure from conservative RZ leaders, RZ male
372
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soldiers have also been given exemptions from serving with women in various units,
which result in the removal of women from these units and their diminished opportunities during their army service.382 Similarly, in academia, while the current policy
of allowing sex-segregated classes is restricted to members of the UO community,
a petition was filed to the Israeli Supreme Court by conservative members of the RZ
community, claiming that they too are religiously required to study in sex-segregated
classes, and asking the court to declare that such sex-segregated classes should be open
to any student who desires to study in them, regardless of their religious convictions.383
The result of the above discussion is that the segregation of women in the public
sphere in Israel for religious reasons is a grave violation of women’s rights that
cannot be justified under any of the justifications used to vindicate it, including religious freedom, freedom of conscience, equality, and multiculturalism. Nevertheless,
this segregation continues to exist and even spread, and its supporters keep evoking
these justifications in support of it.384 In the next Section, I discuss the tactics used
by religious conservatives in Israel to deepen and expand the segregation and exclusion
of women in the public sphere and their similarity to the tactics used by religious
conservatives in the United States to restrict women’s reproductive rights.385
V. COMPARING THE MODE OF OPERATION OF RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVES
IN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL
There are at least three points of similarity in the tactics used by religious conservatives in Israel to those used by religious conservatives in the United States in
their parallel struggles to restrict women’s right to control their bodies.
The first point of similarity is that both groups argue that anything short of an
unconditional and sweeping acceptance of their own rights claims would constitute
a grave violation of their religious freedoms, using this reasoning as an excuse to
increase and extend the scope of their demands incrementally.386 The demands of the
UO in Israel started with segregation in public buses and have gradually expanded
into segregation and exclusion in the Army, academia, and various services in the
public sphere.387 In addition to gradually expanding to additional settings, their
382
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demands have also expanded in each of the settings. In academia, despite the fact
that initially the segregation of women was supposed to be limited only to bachelor
degree programs, the UO have increased their demands and the Council of Higher
education has been gradually approving the expansion of the segregation to graduate
degrees and Ph.D. programs.388 Similarly, the segregation that was supposed to be
limited only to the classes themselves has been expanded to cover the whole campus, and accompanied by strict dress codes and modesty rules.389 In the Army, the
military authorities have promised the UO men that their entire Army service would
be carried out in what the Army itself defines as “Women-Free Zones” despite the
obvious fact that outside of the Army these UO men do not live in “Women-Free
Zones”.390 Similarly, despite clear statements by the authorities that the segregation
will not carry into the labor market, the government has initiated segregated professional training for UO men in the Israeli Civil Service, and a petition to open the
course for both sexes has been denied.391
Every step in the gradual expansion is explained as a necessary accommodation
without which the UO would not be able to integrate into society and realize their
basic rights to study, work, and make a living. Each step is used as justification for the
necessity of the next step. Thus, according to proponents of the expanding segregation, if the UO have been used to their own segregated society they must be provided with one in the army, and after finishing the army, they must be provided with
a segregated academia and then with a segregated workforce, and any limitations on
the rights of others, such as women, are merely minor and necessary concessions
which they must make in order to respect the rights of the UO.392
Moreover, while at first it was conceded that the segregation in the public sphere
was not mandated by any religious edict, this stance has gradually changed as the
objections to the expanding segregation mounted and with it the need to find better
explanations for its necessity.393 Exploiting the liberal unwillingness to question or
assess religious motivations the UO have started claiming that gender segregation in the
public sphere is in fact religiously mandated.394 This new position has become official
in a letter by the Chief Rabbi of Israel in which he states as much in response to a
388
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decision by a regional Labor Court that ordered the desegregation of the professional
training for UO men in the Israeli Civil Service and the inclusion of women in the
training.395 The regional court’s decision was stayed by the National Labor Court
following an appeal in which the Chief Rabbi’s letter was produced as evidence and
later the Israeli Supreme Court rejected the petition against the stay, leaving the segregation in professional training courses in preparation for entry into the Israeli Civil
Service in place.396
A similar pattern of both sweeping and increasing demands can be discerned in
the Hobby Lobby, Zubik and the Little Sisters of the Poor cases in the United States.
In Hobby Lobby, the petitioners, religious employers who were required to pay
comprehensive health insurance for their employees, claimed that their religious
freedom was violated by the fact that the insurance may later be used by their
women employees, at their own discretion, to acquire contraceptives.397 While the
majority of the Court conceded that the act of paying for comprehensive health
insurance was “innocent in itself” it still held that the mere subjective belief of the
religious employer that the payment was immoral is enough for the payment to
constitute a “substantial burden” under RFRA and provide the employer with an
exemption from paying women health insurance that may cover contraception.398
This reasoning was further expanded by religious conservatives when in Zubik,
religious organizations claimed that even notifying the government that they have
religious objections to the full coverage was in itself complicity with an immoral
act.399 While the Court remanded the cases to the lower courts without deciding on
the merits of the case, it did instruct the lower courts to try to arrive at an approach
that accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while ensuring that women receive
full and equal health coverage.400 The conditional acknowledgment that petitioners’
religious exercise is implicated even by the mere notification to the government that
they are not willing to pay full insurance has expanded the scope of religious exercise
beyond any reasonable legal standard and has paved the way for the Trump Administration’s interim and final rules, that were affirmed by the Supreme Court in the
Little Sisters of the Poor case.401 These rules significantly broaden the definition of
an exempt religious employer to encompass any employer that objects to contraceptive coverage on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs, including for-profit and
395
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publicly traded entities, and exempt such employers even from the need to participate
in the self-certification process that can ensure that their employees receive coverage
through government plans.402 Moreover, parallel rules offer a “moral exemption” for
non-profit employers, for-profit employers with no publicly traded components, and
for any other employer who holds moral objections to providing some or all forms of
contraceptive coverage, regardless of the harm that such exemptions cause to women.403
A similar grant of wide and exclusive exemptions to religious conservative
entities is evident in the NIFLA case.404 In this case, medical facilities that objected
to abortion for religious reasons claimed that the California FACT Act requiring
them to inform patients of the availability of state-sponsored abortion services was
unconstitutional and violated their First Amendment right to free speech.405 The
majority of the Supreme Court accepted this argument, holding that the FACT Act
violated the First Amendment.406 The four dissenting justices noted that the majority’s decision contradicted prior court precedent in which the Court held that general
state regulation of business activity, and especially of health related activity, does
not impinge on the constitutional protection of free speech.407 Specifically, the
NIFLA majority decision contradicted the Casey decision, which is the controlling
precedent on the duty of reproductive health clinics to supply information to women
patients.408 In Casey, the Court held that laws requiring clinics to provide women
seeking abortion with information on the condition of the fetus, medical assistance
for childbirth, potential child support, and adoption services, did not violate the
clinics’ right to free speech.409 The Casey Court reasoned that laws requiring
reproductive health clinics to provide women with information related to their reproductive health options amounted to reasonable measures to ensure that the
patients can make an informed choice and were part of the reasonable licensing and
regulation to which the practice of medicine is subject.410 Applying this standard, the
402
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minority justices in NIFLA observed that there is no convincing reason to distinguish between Casey and NIFLA and to hold that the FACT Act violated the First
Amendment rights of the clinics, whereas the law at issue in Casey did not violate
clinics’ free speech rights.411 Furthermore, as the NIFLA minority pointed out, the
strongly held religious and non-religious convictions on both sides of the debate
regarding the permissibility or impermissibility of abortion make evenhandedness
in the application of the First Amendment in these cases all the more important.412
Such evenhandedness, as well as women’s right to make an informed choice, would
demand that NIFLA’s pro-life clinics, which object to abortion for religious reasons,
be required to inform women patients that the state provides free or low-cost
services, including abortions, just as pro-choice clinics, which object to pressuring
women into carrying the fetus to term, are required to inform women patients of
state sponsored pro-life services.413 Instead, the majority decision in NIFLA gives
pro-life clinics preferential treatment that is contrary to existing precedent and in
contravention of women’s right to make an informed choice.414
The above are all examples for how religious conservatives in both Israel and
the United States use the indefinite contours of the rights to freedom of religion and
conscience and the liberal unwillingness to probe religious and conscientious claims,
as well as their own significant political power and influence, in order to expand the
reach of their conservative agenda at the expense of women’s rights.
The second point of similarity in the tactics used by religious conservatives in
Israel and the United States is that they all deny that the unconditional acceptance
of their religious claims would violate the rights of women.415 Moreover, this tactic
is often adopted by state institutions to justify their accommodation of religious
conservative claims.416 Thus, in Israel for example, state authorities supporting
gender exclusion and segregation in the public sphere deny that such exclusion and
segregation violate women’s rights.417 Although the doctrine of separate but equal
was generally rejected by the Israeli Supreme Court, and the Court even struck down
specifically the practice of gender segregation in public transportation as discriminatory towards women, many other segregationist practices still prevail, including in
academia, the Army, and various other public places, despite their clear violation of
women’s rights.418
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To give just one example, the gender segregation in academia involves barring
women professors from teaching UO male students, while male professors can teach
both male and female UO students.419 The Council for Higher Education approved
this restriction and has denied that it violates women’s right to equality.420 According to the Council, institutions of higher education may not discriminate against
women professors in hiring, but they can decide to assign only male professors to
teach male UO students. The Council’s position stands in clear violation of the
Israeli Employment (Equal Opportunities) Law, which prohibits discrimination at
any stage of the employment and in any condition of employment on the basis of
sex.421 Nevertheless, the Council posits that its policy does not discriminate against
women since institutions are able to give women professors other classes to teach.422
The Council is ignoring the substantial risk that as a result of its own discriminatory
policy, institutions of higher learning will prefer to hire men as professors instead
of women, since men can teach all courses while women can only teach some.423
This pattern of denying discrimination against women involved in gender segregation is similarly evident with respect to gender segregation in the Army and in other
public places.424 It serves to confer legitimacy on a discriminatory practice by
denying its discriminatory effects, leaving only the religious motivation as a powerful justification in favor of accommodation. This same pattern was adopted by the
Israeli Supreme Court in its decision in the segregation in academia cases, that was
given after four years of dithering.425 Rejecting most of the petition the Court chose
to ignore the inevitably discriminatory effects of the segregation on women and to
settle for instructing the ICHE to ascertain that it implements the segregation
without violating women’s right to equality. Even while partly accepting the prong
of the petition aimed against the discrimination against women professors the Court
chose to refrain from ordering that women professors should be allowed to teach all
courses. As a result, institutions of higher education can continue the practice of
assigning women professors exclusively to elective courses which the UO students
can choose not to take, thereby restricting women professors’ work opportunities on
account of their sex.
419

See Stopler, Constitutionalism and Religion, supra note 5, at 219.
See id.
421
§ 2(a) Employment (Equal Opportunities) Law, 5748-1988, SH 1240 64 (Isr.), http://
www.knesset.gov.il/review/data/eng/law/kns11_equalopportunity_eng.pdf.
422
See § 91 262RH0 Multiyear Plan (2017–2022) Widening the Accessibility of Higher
Education for Ultra-Orthodox, Council of Higher Education.
423
See id.
424
See Yefet, supra note 85, at 258–59.
425
HCJ 8010/16 Berzon v. Council for Higher Education; HCJ 6500/17 Dr. Yofi Tirosh
v. Council for Higher Education; 8683/17 Kohelet Policyy Forum v. Council for Higher
Education (2021) (Isr.), https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=Hebrew
Verdicts\16\100\080\k61&fileName=16080100.K61&type=4 [https://perma.cc/5NMJ-RPKK].
420

750

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:689

A similar pattern can be observed in the United States. In the Hobby Lobby case,
the dissenting justices and numerous commentators observed that the majority’s
assumption that the exemption given to religious employers does not harm the rights
of women employees was clearly mistaken.426 The de facto result of granting
religious employers an exemption from paying full health insurance coverage for
their women employees was that these women had to pay for contraceptives out of
their own pockets rather than have them covered by their insurance.427 Nevertheless,
this false assumption served as the basis for the ruling in favor of petitioners.428
Similarly, in Zubik, religious petitioners claimed women employees will not be
harmed by petitioners’ exemption since the women can purchase insurance for
contraception in the private market, although such an option did not exist.429 The
Court remanded the case to the lower courts instructing them to arrive at an approach that accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while ensuring full and
equal health coverage for women.430 However, such an approach was not likely to
emerge, since it would have entailed allocating funds for state subsidies of contraceptive health coverage for insured women.431 Funds for state subsidies for family
planning services are very scarce to begin with and are insufficient to cover even the
needs of the uninsured women to whom they were originally directed.432 Moreover,
at the time of the decision they were being further restricted by the Trump administration.433 It would seem naïve to assume that the Court was not aware of this fact
when it gave its decision.
And indeed, as expected, in Little Sisters of the Poor, the administration explained to the Court that there was no feasible way to accommodate religious
employers’ demands while at the same time ensuring full and equal contraceptive
coverage for women.434 Consequently, the administration decided, and the Court
affirmed, that while protecting the religious liberty of religious employers to the full
426
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extent of their demands was required by RFRA, ensuring women employees’ full
and equal contraceptive coverage was not a compelling state interest and could simply
be relinquished.435 As Justice Thomas summarily explained while dismissing the claim
that women employees denied full and equal contraceptive coverage are harmed:
The dissent and the court below suggest that the new rule is
improper because it imposes burdens on the employees of entities that the rule exempts, . . . but the rule imposes no such
burden. A woman who does not have the benefit of contraceptive coverage under her employer’s plan is not the victim of a
burden imposed by the rule or her employer. She is simply not
the beneficiary of something that federal law does not provide.436
The NIFLA case provides another example in which the majority of the Court
chose to ignore the harm caused to women due to the protection granted to religious
conservatives’ claims of conscience.437 The majority rejected California’s claim that
the FACT Act requiring the clinics to provide women patients with information on
available state-sponsored services, including abortion, was necessary to ensure that
the women patients can make an informed choice regarding their reproductive
health.438 The Court reasoned that the service provided by appellant pro-life clinics
should not be considered a medical procedure and therefore no informed consent is
necessary.439 As the four dissenting justices pointed out, this claim is wrong.440 Similarly to pro-choice clinics, pro-life clinics engage medical personnel that provide
women with medical services that directly affect their health.441 Moreover, in the
United States “‘child birth is 14 times more likely than abortion to result in’ the
woman’s death.”442 Consequently, the distinction between reproductive health services
provided by pro-choice clinics and reproductive health services provided by pro-life
clinics, which allegedly justified withholding information from women patients that
visit pro-life clinics lacks any moral, practical, or legal force.443
The third point of similarity in the tactics used by religious conservatives in
Israel and the United States is that while they claim that their goal is to protect their
personal religious beliefs, conscience, or culture, their unstated goal is to affect a
wide ranging change in the legal protection afforded to women in order to prevent
435
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them from exercising their equal rights.444 In Israel, gender exclusion and segregation
in the public sphere was initially portrayed as a necessary and temporary accommodation aimed to advance the integration of UO members into the larger, gender-mixed
Israeli society.445 However, the more widespread the gender exclusion and segregation becomes and the longer they persist, the more religious conservatives insist that
allowing permanent gender exclusion and segregation in the public sphere is
necessary in order to respect the rights of religious people.446 Even state institutions
that initially claimed they support gender segregation merely as an interim arrangement have come to accept and defend it as a permanent and necessary accommodation.447 Thus, the Council for Higher Education—which initially claimed that the
gender segregation in academia is only required as a first step in UO integration in
mixed society—has changed its position and is now claiming that anything short of
instituting permanent gender segregation and even expanding it to graduate studies,
would violate the UO’s rights and jeopardize the interests of the state in UO integration.448 At the same time, the more conservative factions of the Religious Zionist
community are demanding permission to open their own sex-segregated programs
for anyone who desires them, claiming that the freedoms of religion, conscience,
and association entitle them to such a right.449 Thus, gender segregation in the public
sphere for religious reasons is no longer a limited exception but a common reality that
seriously threatens the whole rationale behind antidiscrimination legislation.
A similar pattern of expansion, by which the exception becomes the rule, is
evident in the United States. While Hobby Lobby expanded the rationale of exemptions for religious organizations to allow for exemptions to religious corporate
employers, Zubik further extended Hobby Lobby’s rationale, and the Trump administration rules affirmed in Little Sisters of the Poor have widened the exemption to
such an extent that not only will it most likely affect tens of thousands of women,
but also that the exemption has clearly become the rule since there is no longer any
barrier for its utilization by almost any employer who wishes to do so.450
CONCLUSION
Thus, step by step, the individual accommodations and exemptions for religion
turn the exception into the rule. Powerful religious conservative groups exploit the
patriarchal nature of liberal societies and the societal obsession with the control over
women’s bodies, as well as inherent flaws in political liberal theory, to gain significant
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victories in their war on women.451 By weaponizing liberal rights, such as religious
freedom, freedom of conscience, multiculturalism, and equality, majoritarian religious
conservative groups turn these rights against disempowered women, using them to
roll back women’s right to control their bodies, and to restore or create the conservative order to which they are committed.452
Due to the religious conservatives’ political power, the patriarchal nature of liberal
societies, and the flaws in liberal theory, policy makers, state institutions, and courts are
keen to accommodate religious conservative concerns over who controls women’s
bodies and are too quick to approve widespread restrictions on women’s rights.
With a “starved Establishment Clause,” “gluttonous Free Exercise Clause” and
RFRA,453 and a politically powerful Christian Nationalist movement that has a
stronghold in the Supreme Court, the ability of religious conservatives to turn private
prejudice into public policy in the United States is as potent as the ability of religious conservatives in Israel to do so, and the consequences for women’s right to
control their bodies in both cases are dire.454 As the Israeli example shows, claims
for accommodations and exemptions based on politically powerful religious consciences may extend well beyond the refusal to be complicit in securing reproductive rights, and can just as easily be used to roll back settled antidiscrimination law
or move women out of the public sphere altogether.455
Robert Post argues that religion and conscience-based exemptions can only be
a privilege exercised by a relatively small number of people.456 If such exemptions
become routine or commonplace they undermine the force and authority of law
itself.457 This, Post claims, does not only cause harm to third parties, but also to
democracy: “When the faithful claim the right to exemptions as a means to undo in
law what they have failed to achieve in politics, the stakes are the democratic
process itself. That is a very high price, even to protect religious freedom.”458 In this
Article, I have shown that the stakes for the liberal democratic constitutional framework in general and for women’s rights in particular are even higher when powerful
religious conservative groups, such as the Christian nationalists in the United States and
the Jewish Ultra-Orthodox and Religious Zionists in Israel, are successfully using
both law and politics to turn their private religious prejudices into public policy.459
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